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JUSTICE MIRIAM SHEARING: NEVADA'S
TRAILBLAZING MINIMALIST
Mary Berkheiser*
Nevada Supreme Court Justice Miriam Shearing retired at the end of her
second term on January 4, 2005. Over the nearly thirty years of her very public
life on the bench, many have ,written of her accomplishments as the first
woman to enter the brotherhood of the Nevada judiciary.' With Justice Shear-
ing's retirement, the time is ripe for an examination of her judicial decisions
during the twelve years she served on the Nevada Supreme Court. The analysis
here provides one perspective on her body of work. It begins, as it must, with a
glimpse into the person behind the work.
I. A BRIEF LIFE HISTORY
Miriam Shearing is a self-described "loner."' One may find this an anom-
alous appellation for a person who has amassed a record of "firsts" unparalleled
in Nevada history, but Shearing could write the book on how one indisposed to
the limelight can succeed by sheer grit and a little luck. She broke through the
all-male bastion of the Nevada judiciary not just once, but four times: first, as a
juvenile court referee; 3 second, as a justice of the peace;4 third, as a district
court judge;5 and finally, as a justice on the Nevada Supreme Court.6 All but
the first required Shearing to campaign for, and be elected to, the post.7 So is
Miriam Shearing just a passel of contradictions? While she has a host of good
company if she is, one suspects there is more to her than that. Indeed, she
appears to have much in common with her sisters on the bench across the coun-
try. A study of federal judges suggests that the women among them have com-
mon "childhood experiences as independent loners," which prepared them "to
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cope successfully as adults with the threatening and isolating experience of
competing in a male-dominated field." 8
Unearthing a bit of Shearing's roots reveals the beginnings of her life as
one of those "independent loners." The oldest of three children, Shearing grew
up on a farm near the small town of Spencer, New York.9 Shearing's parents
were of Finnish ancestry, and she spoke Finnish right along with them." °
Shearing left farm life to attend nearby Cornell University, where she earned a
Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy 1 and, like many other women (and
men), met her partner for life, husband Steven.12
Shearing often has described her entry into the study of law as "serendipi-
tous."1 3 When Steven decided to go to medical school, Shearing thought that
she should take the opportunity to pursue a professional degree herself.14 Law
school was the only professional degree program for which her undergraduate
studies had prepared her, so law school is where Shearing went. 5 She attended
Boston College of Law at night, while working as a project control officer for
the United States Army research and engineering command.' 6 Not long after
she began her law studies, Shearing realized law school was where she
belonged, and her graduation near the top of the class bore out that early
assessment. 17
After law and medical school, the Shearings departed the East Coast for
California, where Steven completed his internship and residency, and then trav-
eled to Pakistan, where Dr. Shearing worked with CARE.' 8 Upon their return
to the United States, the Shearings decided to practice their professions in Las
Vegas.' 9 In 1969, Shearing became the fiftieth woman lawyer admitted to
practice in Nevada.2 ° Soon after her admission to the Nevada bar, Shearing
discovered that "all of us [women lawyers] were considered somewhat suspect
8 Id.
I Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2; see also Graber, supra note 7, at 9.
10 Graber, supra note 7, at 12.
I' Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
12 Deanne M. Rymarowicz, Presenting Judicial Firsts, NEV. LAW., May 2003, at 26.
13 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Rymarowicz, supra note 12, at 26.
1 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2. Justice Shearing explained that, upon
graduation, she received a letter from the law school dean advising her that she was eligible
for membership in the Order of the Coif, as she was in the top ten percent of the class (based
on all students-day and evening), but that the faculty had voted against Coif membership
for evening students. Id.
Is Rymarowicz, supra note 12, at 26.
19 Id.
20 Mel Parkinson, Against All Odds, Nevada's First 100 Female Attorneys Forged New
Paths, NEV. LAW. Mar. 2000, at 21.
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by the male lawyers."'" Thus, Shearing followed the lead of local women law-
yers like Emily Wanderer, and started her own practice.22
Shearing did not set out to be a trailblazer for Nevada women. She once
said: "Most of us who have broken barriers didn't start out to pave the way for
other women. We just wanted to do what we wanted to do." 23 After several
years in practice in Las Vegas, Shearing was the beneficiary of a second seren-
dipitous opportunity. In 1975, Clark County Juvenile Court Judge John F.
Mendoza asked her to serve as a juvenile court referee.24 Once appointed to
that post, Shearing soon realized that the role of judicious decision maker
suited her better than the role of advocate. Shearing had "always been able to
see the other side of a case," and, as a juvenile court referee, she was able to do
what came naturally to her.26
History has shown that what suited Shearing suited the people of Nevada.
After her stint in the juvenile court, Shearing sought appointment by the Clark
County Commissioners to an open seat on the justice court.27 None of the
commissioners agreed to consider her, and one commissioner even told her,
"basically ... that I, or any other woman, didn't belong on the court."2 8 That
rebuff propelled Shearing "to do something I never would have dreamed of
doing. I went ahead and ran for election." 29 During her campaign for justice
of the peace, people were "very receptive. In fact, both men and women said,
'It's about time!' , 30 Shearing won her first time out and "without the support
of the power structure.' Most of those who appeared before her as a justice
of the peace were respectful.32 There were those, however, who "could not
accept that a woman could know how to be a judge-especially when [she] did
not necessarily follow the traditional male model of running a courtroom.
3 3
Shearing's next step was to run for the district court. In 1980 she ran
against an incumbent and, despite winning the primary handily, lost the elec-
tion after a campaign against her that "thoroughly trash[ed her] and [her] abili-
ties." 34 The trashing went so far as to say that her election "would be a disaster
21 Miriam Shearing, Then & Now: A Las Vegas Woman Attorney's Perspective, COMMUNI-
QUt, Sept. 2005, at 40. Shearing's experience as a woman in the male-dominated Nevada
bar was not altogether new. Earlier, when she was seeking employment as a lawyer in San
Francisco during her husband's medical residency, she had received a telephone call from a
law firm informing her that the firm's policy was that women should be at home with their
children. Rymarowicz, supra note 12, at 26.
22 Shearing, supra note 21, at 40.
23 Vogel, supra note 6, at lB.
24 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2. With characteristic humility, Shearing
freely acknowledges that she benefited from the affirmative action sensibilities of Judge
Mendoza. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Shearing, supra note 21, at 40.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 41.
33 Id.
34 Id.
[Vol. 6:156
JUSTICE MIRIAM SHEARING
to the state, ' 35 a claim that seems "a little excessive" to Shearing even now.36
Throughout it all, Shearing took the high road and did not respond in kind.37
Two years later, after the legislature created new district court judgeships,
Shearing announced her candidacy and soon learned to her delight that those
who remembered the trashing admired her pluck for coming back and trying
again.3 8 She recalls at least one person saying, "[o]h, you're not the wimp I
thought you were when you didn't answer the charges."3 9 Others were not
convinced that any woman should take the bench; election polling revealed that
twelve percent of those polled "said they would never ever vote for a woman
judge."4 ° Shearing did not need the votes of that benighted minority, however;
the time had come for Nevada to seat its first woman judge on a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction.
From her vantage point on the bench in juvenile, justice and district court,
Shearing saw bias against women in the manner in which police, prosecutors,
and judges handled disputes involving or affecting them.4 1 Prosecutors fre-
quently dropped rape cases, citing a "lack of evidence."42 In those cases,
Shearing remarked, "it was the prosecutors' attitude that 'it's just her word
against his.' But you never heard that in a robbery case. Maybe someone lied
to the police about being robbed, but at least it would go to trial so a jury could
decide,"4 3 Shearing, too, experienced the reluctance of some men to recognize
that what a woman said or did in the courtroom could be legitimate. Once,
while she still was the lone woman on the bench, a male divorce litigant
insisted that Shearing recuse herself because she "couldn't possibly be fair to
him."" Apparently, Shearing later observed, it had never occurred to him that
women had "been facing men judges since time immemorial."4 5
Shearing's inaugural campaign for the Nevada Supreme Court was "mis-
erable,"4 6 but her experience in her first run for the district court had prepared
her "to slug it out and [win] ...a tight race."4 7 Shearing recalls that her
reception at the supreme court was "cordial, but there was some skepticism. ,48
She knew she had turned the corner when one of the justices told her, "You
know, I don't feel at all uncomfortable working with you!" 49 Not a shred of
bitterness, but more a sense of bemusement, infuses Shearing's comments on
her own encounters with male chauvinism.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
42 Id.
43 id.
4 Shearing, supra note 21, at 41.
45 id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 42.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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Because Shearing accomplished so many firsts for a woman lawyer, inter-
views with Shearing often have focused on her gender.5 ° Shortly after she was
appointed to the Clark County Juvenile Court, an interviewer asked Shearing if
she presented a maternal image from the bench and if that made a difference to
the children in the courtroom.5 ' Her answer was what one who knows her
would expect: that gender did not determine whether one was a good judge,
and that some people, regardless of gender, simply had a rapport with children,
while others did not.5 2 Here, Shearing reflects the attitude of her counterpart
on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
quoted a colleague as saying that in the end, "a wise old man and a wise old
woman [will] reach the same decision."5 3 Like O'Connor,5 4 Shearing believes
there is real value in having women (as well as racial and ethnic minorities) on
the bench.5 Her views accord with those of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who commented in an address to the National Association of Women
Judges: "Our system of justice is surely richer for the diversity of background
and experience of its judges. It was poorer, in relation to the society law exists
to serve, when nearly all of its participants were cut from the same mold."
56
As Shearing forged ahead with her career,57 she never lost sight of her
unique role as an agent for change in what for many years continued to be a
closed society of male privilege.5 8 Much of her impact on the supreme court is
not evident because it is embedded in the published opinions of her male coun-
terparts, whose language and approach, particularly in cases involving women
or children, Shearing sought to influence through informal meetings and careful
drafting of revisions to their draft opinions.59 Shearing prides herself on being
even-handed and fair, but is quick to acknowledge that the court needed at least
one person with a different perspective, and she was glad to be that person.6"
One of the biggest compliments she ever got, Shearing recalled, was from a
lawyer who specialized in custody disputes: he was always happy to be in her
courtroom because he knew the husband would get a fair shake.6"
S0 See, e.g., Coffman, supra note 4, at 9; Sheets, supra note 5, at 7, 10-11.
5' Chrystal, supra note 3, at 11.
52 Id.
51 Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1546, 1558 (1991) (quoting
Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Jeanne Coyne, but lamenting "New Feminism" focus on
gender differences in judging, "precisely because it so nearly echoes the Victorian myth of
the 'True Woman' that kept women out of law for so long." Id. at 1553.).
54 See id. at 1549-53.
55 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
56 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progress at the Bar and on the Bench, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 801, 807 (2004).
51 Constance L. Akridge, Honoring Justice Miriam Shearing, COMMUNiQUt, Nov. 2003, at
5.
58 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2. See also Associated Press, Procedures in
Case Targeted by Justice, NEV. APPEAL, July 7, 1994, at A-1 (reporting on Shearing inter-
view in which she complained of other justices trying "to go around her in their handling of
cases, including the case of [Second Judicial District Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead]").
19 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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While many describe Shearing as quiet and soft-spoken,62 Shearing did
not hesitate, even early in her judicial career, to share her views on the justice
system. As a juvenile court referee, she believed that the court's role was to
help, not punish, the child.63 She thought children needed rehabilitation in
whatever way worked for each individual child.64 When Shearing ran for the
district court in 1982, she said that the best way to make the community safer is
to "bring swift justice" to criminals. 65 As a trial court judge, she viewed jail
time as a necessity to keep first time offenders from becoming recidivists. 66
Those views, however, always were tempered by her respect for the rights of
those charged with committing a crime. As a candidate for Justice of the
Peace, Shearing said, "each person deserves to have his say and come away
from court, regardless of the decision, with the feeling that he has had a full
hearing by someone who cares."67
Shearing's politics are not easy to pinpoint. She defies simple categoriza-
tion as a conservative or a liberal, but instead is pro-choice, pro-woman, and
tough on crime. 68 As a judicial officer in a death penalty state, Shearing wrote
decisions that may be viewed as pro-death penalty. 69 But her allegiance to the
law she had sworn to uphold never sheltered her from distress over the state of
death penalty litigation in Nevada. Nearly ten years ago, and long before the
state legislature enacted a number of reforms,7 ° Shearing voiced concerns over
the lack of qualified death penalty lawyers in the state 7 1 and the low rate of pay
for that most demanding work.72
During the 1992 campaign for the Supreme Court, Shearing called herself
"unbought and unbossed" by casinos,73 which undoubtedly resonated with
Nevadans. Her election win over her male rival, long the favorite for the cov-
eted high court position, 4 confirmed the wisdom of her message. As a justice,
Shearing maintained her quiet independence and typically gave no hint of her
thinking during oral argument or elsewhere.75 When the court took the bench,
Shearing was well prepared on the issues, but asked questions of the lawyers
62 See, e.g., Mike Henderson, "Quiet Justice" Seeks to Quell Bickering and Restor Respect
to Embattled Bench, RENO GAZETrE-J., Dec. 12, 1996, at IA.
63 Chrystal, supra note 3, at It.
64 Id.
65 Shearing Enters Race, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 15, 1982, at 7B.
66 Id.
67 Shearing Announces Candidacy, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 30, 1976, at lB.
68 Supreme Court Hopeful Seeks a 'Name' in Elko, ELKO DAILY FREE PRESS, July 29, 1992,
at 18.
69 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2. Shearing acknowledges that she is not
convinced of the efficacy of the death penalty and regards it as far too expensive. She
believes that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is "sufficiently harsh," and
"in light of recent exonerations, [is] concerned about killing the innocent." Id.
70 See 2003 Nev. Stat. 442-43.
71 Henderson, supra note 12, at 8A.
72 id.
73 Philip Hager, Nevada Elects First Woman to High Court, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at
A12.
74 See id.
71 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2; see also Cy Ryan, Shearing Finds Smooth
Transition, Las Vegas Sun, Sept. 14, 1993, at A6.
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only when she did not understand something they said or wanted to see how far
they would take an argument. 6 She viewed oral argument as the lawyers'
time, not hers, and engaging in dialogue with the lawyers to demonstrate her
grasp of the issues simply was not her style.77
Shearing toppled the final barrier to gender equality in the Nevada judici-
ary when she was named Chief Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court in 1997.78
As Chief, she sought to move the court past internal problems it had faced in
recent years, 79 to implement new procedures for managing the court's ever-
increasing caseload,8 ° and to help create a cohesive body of law for Nevada.8'
In the view of the court's current Chief Justice, Nancy Becker, Justice Shearing
was successful on all fronts, though much remains for the court to do in the
areas of caseload management and establishing consistency in Nevada law.
82
In 2003, Shearing announced that she would not seek another term on the
court.8 3 Shearing has not, however, left public life entirely. Since her retire-
ment earlier this year, Shearing has enjoyed the status of "senior judge," 84 with
a welcome return to the trial court bench, and she regularly sits by designation
on the supreme court as needed.8 5
Chief Justice Nancy Becker has remarked that she misses the "calming
influence" and "wealth of experience and perspective" Justice Shearing brought
to the court.86 Shearing "definitely was a mentor" for Becker when she joined
the court in 1999.87 Becker shares Shearing's view that the court's role is "to
resolve the issues and questions of public policy before us, and avoid going
beyond that."88 On issues of first impression and statutory or constitutional
interpretation, Shearing always "wanted to look at how the court's decision
would play out in the real world."'89 In Becker's view, Shearing's most impor-
tant contributions to the court's jurisprudence were in the area of child custody,
particularly the "best interests" of the child analysis, "where she brought some
of our divergent case law into alignment." 90 With Shearing's departure,
another justice (or justices) will need to assume the role of consensus builder;
just who that will be is not yet clear.91
76 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
77 Id.; see also Ryan, supra note 75, at A6.
78 Vogel, supra note 6, at 1B.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Interview with Nancy Becker, C.J., Nev. Sup. Ct., in Las Vegas, Nev. (July 29, 2005).
83 No Third Term for First Woman on Nevada Supreme Court, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 1,
2003, at C21.
84 See NEV. SuP. CT. R. 10 (providing for temporary assignment of retired justices and
judges in good standing to "any state court at or below the level of the court in which he or
she was serving at the time of retirement").
85 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
86 Interview with Nancy Becker, supra note 82.
87 Id; see also Ed Vogel, Nevada Supreme Court Welcomes "the Cavalry:" Four justices
Sworn in, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Jan. 5, 1999, at 2B.
88 Interview with Nancy Becker, supra note 82.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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Judging from her past, Miriam Shearing will remain a quiet, yet influen-
tial, voice in the development of the law and the advancement of the justice
system in Nevada. We can only hope so.
II. A SELECTED REVIEW OF JUSTICE SHEARING'S BODY OF WORK
A. Introduction: An Analytical Framework
92
University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein has written extensively
of the "legitimate role" of the United States Supreme Court in our constitu-
tional order9 3 and of a philosophical approach he identifies as "decisional
minimalism."94 Judges who are minimalists, as were United States Supreme
Court Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan 95 "are conservative
in the literal sense. They prize stability. They like small steps."9 6 Minimalists
eschew "ambitiously theoretical" doctrines, such as "fundamentalism"9 7 or
"perfectionism,"9 8 and "they hope to do no more than is necessary to resolve
92 The framework I have selected for the analysis of Justice Shearing's decisions is
informed by the work of University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein, a prolific
scholar whose work I admire. As I was reviewing Justice Shearing's professional history
and published decisions, I happened to see an edited version of Sunstein's essay on the
nomination of John Roberts to the United States Supreme Court in the local newspaper. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism: Minimal Appeal, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug.
1, 2005, at 17, [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism] reprinted as edited in
Cass R. Sunstein, Understanding Roberts, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 24, 2005, at IE. Thus, as
with so much of life and letters, it was serendipity and not a deliberate engagement in
heuristics that led to the analysis suggested here.
9' CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 8 (1999).
94 Id. at 4. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 47 (2004);
Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Arguments, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). Sunstein has tackled a
wide array of constitutional questions in his study and critique of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARozo L. REV. 2081 (2005);
Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred
Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2 D 39 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19
HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have
Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205 (1991).
91 Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, supra note 92, at 18 (describing Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan as "deploring [the Warren] Court's tendency to issue sweeping rules
(as, for example its decisions giving broad protections to free speech and the right to
vote).").
96 Id.
97 Id. at 19. Fundamentalists, like Justice Clarence Thomas and, to a slightly lesser extent,
Justice Antonin Scalia, "are committed to 'originalism' and treat that commitment as a fight-
ing faith." Id. "[F]undamentalists believe that the Constitution should be read to fit with the
original understanding of the Founding Fathers; they are willing to make large-scale changes
to return to that understanding." Id. at 17. They "have radical inclinations," because they
"know that current constitutional law rejects their own approach, and they tend to feel angry
and even embattled about that fact." Id. at 18.
98 Id. at 17. Perfectionist justices "want to interpret the Constitution to promote individual
rights." Id. The Warren Court "fell squarely into the perfectionist camp," id., and Justices
William Brennan, William 0. Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall "can all be described as
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cases."99  Put another way: "Instead of adopting theories, they decide
cases."' 0 Those characteristics, Sunstein argues, promote "a democratic
nation's highest aspirations without preempting democratic processes."''
°
Minimalism "is still very much alive."' 0 2  Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, 10 3 Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, 10 4 and
Stephen Breyer," °5 the "analytical heart" of the Court, 10 6 are cut of minimalist
cloth. But that does not mean, as we know, that they all embrace the same
views. "[T]he minimalist camp is large and diverse. The point is that they
greatly prefer nudges to earthquakes."'0 7 As Sunstein explains, "[b]y itself,
minimalism is a method and a constraint; it is not a program, and it does not
dictate particular results."'
' 0 8
Like her counterparts on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Shear-
ing is not inclined to issue bold or sweeping pronouncements of the law.
Rather, her opinions demonstrate the careful, circumspect approach to judicial
decision making of the Court's minimalists. Analysis of Justice Shearing's
body of work reveals the hallmark of a decisional minimalist: She confined her
rulings to the facts and issues presented in the cases before the court, develop-
ing the law incrementally, one step at a time, and not all in one fell swoop. In
so doing, Justice Shearing enhanced both the Nevada judiciary and the demo-
cratic ideals of the State of Nevada.
Neither space nor timel 0 9permits analysis of every opinion authored by
Justice Shearing. The sections below address issues of particular concern to
her: the role of the judiciary, children's rights, women and the law, and the
fairness of the death penalty. Where appropriate, footnotes incorporate opin-
perfectionists," id. at 18, based on their view that, "to perfect the Constitution, they should
interpret it in broad terms that expand democratic ideals." Id. at 17. Today,
"[plerfectionism can easily be found in the major law schools, but it is no longer a signifi-
cant presence on the federal bench," id. at 18, to the great regret of many of us who grew up
with the Warren Court.
99 Id. at 18.
00 SUNSTEIN, supra note 93, at 9.
'0 Id. at xiv.
102 Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, supra note 92, at 18.
"03 Justice O'Connor's recent retirement from the Supreme Court, and the nomination of
federal appeals court judge John Roberts to replace her, prompted Sunstein to examine Rob-
erts's record and conclude that he is likely to continue in O'Connor's footsteps. See Sun-
stein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, supra note 92, at 17. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
O'Connor's Balance Will Be Missed, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at M5.
1o See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice: Reflections on Roe v. Wade, in
JUDGES ON JUDOING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 194 (David M. O'Brien ed., 2004). Justice
Ginsburg suggests that a less ambitious decision would have prevented much of the post-Roe
controversy and "served to reduce rather than to fuel" it. Id. at 195. The Court could have
accomplished that by simply stopping with its declaration that the Texas abortion statute was
unconstitutional, and not, as the Court did, going on "to fashion a regime blanketing the
subject, a set of rules that displaced virtually every state law then in force." Id. The view
Justice Ginsburg expresses here is distinctively minimalist in its criticism of "[d]octrinal
limbs too swiftly shaped," and broad rule-making in general. Id.
105 SUNSTEIN, supra note 93, at 9.
106 Id.
107 Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, supra note 92, at 18.
10s Id.
'09 Nor the patience of the author or the readership, one might add.
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ions from other areas of the law, both civil and criminal. We examine first the
array of opinions loosely related by their reflections on the role of the judiciary
in its many and varied aspects.
B. The Role of the Judiciary
It is ironic indeed that the early years of the mild mannered, consensus-
building Miriam Shearing's twelve-year career as a justice on Nevada's high
court should be marked by the contentious series of Whitehead v. Nevada Com-
mission on Judicial Discipline decisions 1 0 and that her tenure on the court
should end not long after the furor over Guinn v. Legislature' " subsided. One
might say that, in both instances, cooler heads failed to prevail, as Shearing
often found herself alone, consigned to dissenting from the principal Whitehead
decisions 12 and writing a separate concurrence in the Guinn rehearing deci-
sion." 13 An examination of those cases and other less incendiary ones bearing
on the role of the judiciary reveals Shearing's commitment to narrow rulings
based on a close reading of constitutional, statutory, and procedural language
and on the facts specific to the cases then before the court.
As much as one might wish to avoid mention of the unsavory Whitehead
era at this late date, no discussion of a Nevada Supreme Court justice who
served during those years would be complete without it. The controversy
began in late 1993 when Second Judicial District Court Judge Jerry Carr White-
head petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibi-
tion to halt an investigation against Whitehead by the Nevada Commission on
Judicial Discipline.' Whitehead's attempts to defend himself were under-
standable; the allegations against him, if proven, could cause his removal from
110 The court's decision in early 1995 effectively concluded the proceedings. See White-
head v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline (Whitehead IV), 893 P.2d 866 (Nev. 1995).
The eight other published opinions addressed ancillary issues. See Whitehead v. Nev.
Comm'n on Judicial Discipline (Whitehead VII), 920 P.2d 491 (Nev. 1996) (per curiam),
vacated by Del Papa v. Steffen, 920 P.2d 489 (Nev. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. In re
Whitehead (Del Papa 11), 519 U.S. 1107 (1997); Del Papa v. Steffen, 915 P.2d 245 (Nev.
1996), cert. denied sub nom. In re Steffen (Del Papa 1), 519 U.S. 1107 (1997); Whitehead v.
Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline (Whitehead VI), 908 P.2d 219 (Nev. 1995) (per
curiam); Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline (Whitehead V), 906 P.2d 230
(Nev. 1994); Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline (Whitehead 111), 878 P.2d
913 (Nev. 1994) (disqualifying attorney general's office from representing Commission in
proceedings against state judicial officers); Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Disci-
pline (Whitehead II), 873 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1994) (rejecting Commission's argument, on
rehearing, that it was not answerable to Nevada Supreme Court, except by appeal from a
final order, and reaffirming Whitehead I order); Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial
Discipline (Whitehead 1), 869 P.2d 795 (Nev. 1994), reported at 906 P.2d 230 (Nev. 1994),
reh'g denied, 873 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1994), motion granted in part, 878 P.2d 913 (Nev. 1994)
(directing Commission to produce documents for in camera review).
"' Guinn v. State (Guinn 1), 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), affTd on reh'g, (Guinn I), 76 P.3d
22 (Nev. 2003).
112 See Whitehead V, 906 P.2d at 254 (Shearing, J.,dissenting); Whitehead IV, 893 P.2d at
965 (Shearing, J., dissenting); Whitehead 11, 878 P.2d at 934 (Shearing, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
113 Guinn H, 76 P.3d at 33.
114 See A.D. Hopkins, Reno Judge's Dispute Turns into Landmark, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Nov. 7. 1993. at Al.
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the bench.'"' The implications of Whitehead's petition, however, were
momentous not just for him, but for the judiciary as a whole. Were he to pre-
vail on his assertions that the Commission could not hire a lawyer or interview
witnesses before establishing probable cause, several legal ethics scholars con-
cluded that "there would be no point to having a [Judicial Disciplinary
Commission]."' 16
From the beginning, Shearing appreciated the epic dimensions of White-
head's challenge. His allegations did no less than pit against each other two
entities established by the Nevada Constitution: the Nevada Supreme Court,
created by Article VI, Section 1, and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Dis-
cipline, created by Article VI, Section 21. In an early minority decision, Shear-
ing observed: "Virtually every aspect of this case involves fundamental
questions of the relationship between constitutional bodies of government."
' 1 7
Unfortunately, those important questions were lost in the public sparring and
inflammatory rhetoric of individual justices1.8 for which the Whitehead era is
best remembered." 9
In her separate opinions, Shearing often spoke in the "democracy enhancing"
terms120 characteristic of decisional minimalism. In Whitehead III, Shearing
rejected the majority's ruling, on separation of powers grounds, that the Com-
mission lacked the authority to seek legal counsel from the Office of Attorney
"' Nevada Supreme Court Investigated: Ethics Experts Criticize its Decision to Stay Disci-
plinary Probe of Reno Judge, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 26.
116 Id. at 27.
117 Whitehead I1, 873 P.2d 946, 977 (Nev. 1994) (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
18 See infra note 119. For the most part, Justice Shearing managed to stay above the fray.
She drew fire, however, for joining with Justices Young and Rose, who were disqualified,
see Whitehead VII, 920 P.2d 491, 505 n.12 (Nev. 1996) vacated by Del Papa v. Steffen, 920
P.2d 489 (Nev. 1996), cert. denied sub nom, in issuing an administrative order voiding the
appointment of a special master to investigate the alleged leaks. See S. Matthew Cook,
Extending the Due Process Clause to Prevent a Previously Recused Judge from Later
Attempting to Affect the Case from Which He Was Recused, 1997 BYU L. REV. 423, 428-29
& n.25 (citing Petition for an Order Rescinding Appointment of Special Master Entered
September 1, 1995, and Voiding Associated Expenses, ADKM No. 221 (Nev. Sept. 15,
1995)).
119 See, e.g., Give It Up, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 7, 1996, at C2; Acting Justice Opposes
Probe of Media Leak, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 24, 1994, at B1; A.D. Hopkins, Justices
Continue Quarrel, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 30, 1995, at B 1; A.D. Hopkins, Revocation of
Special Master Brings Reactions of Relief Caution, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 16, 1995, at
A2; A.D. Hopkins, Rose Pins Damage to High Court's Reputation on Justices, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Mar. 4, 1995, at IB; Jon Ralston, High Court Mess Hits New Low, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Jan. 25, 1996, at B5; John L. Smith, As Juice Jobs Go, the Whitehead Case Is One
for the Books, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 1994 at IB; John L. Smith, High Court Cronies
in Search of Whitehead Whistle-Blower, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 10, 1995, at Bl; Ed
Vogel, High Court Slams Probe of Judge, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 23, 1994, at B1.
120 Cf Enter. Citizens Action Comm. v. Clark County Bd. of Comm'rs, 918 P.2d 305, 313
(Nev. 1996) (Shearing, J., dissenting) (noting complicated nature of land use decisions in
urban environment and saying court should be "very circumspect about interfering with the
decisions made by those who are selected by the people . . .to make those decisions");
Carson City v. Price, 934 P.2d 1042 (Nev. 1997) (reversing district court's grant of prelimi-
nary injunction to property owners who failed to act on their claims until affordable housing
project approved unanimously by Carson City Board of Supervisors was nearly seventy-five
percent complete).
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General. '2 l Instead of the majority's strict walling off of one branch of govern-
ment from another, Shearing's view was that "the structure of government is
such that the branches must interact. This is what keeps any one branch from
dominating the government."' 22 Hence, even as a member of the executive
branch, the Commission could exercise judicial functions, just as numerous
administrative agencies commonly do,' 23 without running afoul of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.' 24 For Shearing, the Whitehead proceedings were,
therefore, a legitimate exercise of the Commission's constitutionally delegated
authority. 12
5
A few months later and over another Shearing dissent,' 26 the court ruled in
Whitehead IV that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to proceed to a probable
cause hearing. 127 Having dealt with that impediment, the court granted White-
head's petition, issued certain commands for the Commission's future conduct,
should it initiate further charges against Whitehead, and retained jurisdiction
"to carry forward and implement all determinations and rulings that we have
made in the course of these proceedings or will make in the future."' 128 Shear-
ing was incensed.' 29 She would have dismissed Whitehead's petition and held
that the Commission had jurisdiction to proceed to a probable cause hearing
based on the complaint drafted by the Commission's special counsel.
130
Shearing denounced the majority's suggestion13' that former Commission
counsel had injected into the case the issue whether Whitehead's conduct vio-
lated the Code of Judicial Conduct.' 32 That suggestion, Shearing said, ignored
Whitehead's own allegation, as a ground for his petition, that his conduct had
121 Whitehead I11, 878 P.2d 913, 935 (Nev. 1994) (Shearing, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122 Id.
123 See State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. 83 P.3d 815 (Nev. 2004)
(Shearing, for the court, refusing to supplant judgment of state administrative agency which
had upheld Public Employee Retirement System's assessment of back contributions for
Nevada Department of Transportation archeologists whom it had treated as independent con-
tractors rather than employees); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Perez, 994 P.2d 723 (Nev. 2000)
(Shearing, for the court, upholding administrative appeals officer's award of benefits for
permanent disability, over employer's objection, and holding that statutory requirement of
medical evidence to support permanent disability claim was not applicable when disability
was not result of changed medical condition, but of worker's poor aptitude for vocational
rehabilitation, based on limited English skills, low educational level, and exclusive construc-
tion work experience); Kolnik v. Nev. Employment Sec. Dep't, 908 P.2d 726, 729-30 (Nev.
1996) (Shearing, J., dissenting) (stating that court should not "substitute its judgment of the
evidence for that of the administrative agency," which had denied unemployment benefits to
taxi driver after his firing for misconduct involving two accidents); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v.
Romero, 877 P.2d 541 (Nev. 1994) (Shearing, for the court, upholding reinstatement of
rehabilitation benefits by administrative appeals officer, whose decision was supported by
substantial evidence and was correct as matter of law).
124 Whitehead 111, 878 P.2d at 936.
125 See id. at 937 (analyzing NEv. CONsT. art. VI, § 21).
126 Whitehead IV, 893 P.2d 866, 965 (Nev. 1995) (Shearing, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 941.
128 Id.
129 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
130 Whitehead IV, 893 P.2d at 965 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
131 See id. at 898-99.
132 Id. at 967 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
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no "'legal or ethical relevance to the Code of Judicial Conduct and the function
of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline' and '[t]herefore the Com-
mission is without jurisdiction to impose discipline for such an alleged viola-
tion.'"1 33 Shearing continued: "Once this court agreed to intervene by way of
extraordinary writ to determine the matter of jurisdiction, it had an obligation to
resolve the jurisdictional issues raised by the petition, one of which is that the
alleged conduct does not violate any provisions of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct." 134 Whitehead was, of course, entitled to the presumption of innocence
unless and until the Commission proved the charges against him. 135 Neverthe-
less, the majority's reading of the Code so as to "condone the conduct
described in the complaint,"' 13 6 Shearing maintained, was a "grave disservice to
the judges, attorneys, litigants, and citizens of this State. It is unconscionable
to suggest that the conduct described is not serious enough to be within the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Judicial Discipline."' 137
Shearing also took her colleagues to task for conducting the Whitehead
proceedings behind closed doors. While the Commission was bound by stat-
ute138 to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings, the supreme court was
under no such obligation; quite to the contrary: "Holding secret proceedings to
decide vital issues of law and public policy is contrary to law and tradition in
this state and country."' 139 Shearing went on to describe the public's interest in
the Whitehead proceedings:
Allegations of a district court judge's intimidation and retaliation are of significant
public interest. There is also a strong public interest in understanding (1) why Judge
Whitehead thought that he should not have to answer the allegations contained in the
Commission's complaint, and (2) why the Nevada Supreme Court might see fit to
grant his wishes. The Judge's interest in maintaining his privacy does not amount to
a compelling governmental interest sufficient to overcome these interests.
140
In the end, Whitehead resigned from the district court bench, and the
Commission closed the investigation.' 4 '
113 Id. (quoting Judge Whitehead in his petition).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 976.
137 Id.
138 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4683(1) (2005) (providing for confidentiality of Commission
proceedings before finding of probable cause and formal filing of statement of charges).
139 Whitehead IV, 893 P.2d at 990 (criticizing majority for entering unconstitutional order in
effort to keep proceedings secret and later sanctioning violators of order, and concluding,
"[t]here is no basis for applying sanctions for violation of an unconstitutional order." Id. at
995).
140 Id. at 991.
'' See Give It Up, supra note 119, at C2. Following the Whitehead decisions, the 1995 and
1997 Nevada legislatures passed resolutions amending NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21, and the
voters approved the amendment at the 1998 general election. See Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n
on Judicial Discipline, 22 P.3d 655, 657 n.l (Nev. 2001). The amendment removed from the
Nevada Supreme Court its previously held power to make rules delineating the grounds for
judicial discipline, governing the confidentiality of Commission proceedings, and con-
ducting Commission investigations and hearings. Id. Now, the constitution reposes in the
legislature the powers to delineate grounds for disciplinary action and to establish standards
for Commission investigations and confidentiality. Id. (citing NEV. CONST. art. VI, §
21(5)(a)-(b)). The amendment also empowered the Commission to adopt its own procedural
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In 2003, the year preceding Shearing's retirement, the court again encoun-
tered controversy and public outrage142 when it issued its ruling in Guinn v.
Legislature.4 3 Local and national press accounts might lead one to believe
that "the court had forcibly displaced the State Legislature by means of a vio-
lent coup d'etat."'" There was talk of a recall of the majority justices' 45 and
of referenda to repeal the tax increase,' 46 and some of the justices received
threats of physical harm.'4 7 The furor began when Nevada Governor Kenny
Guinn petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus declaring
the state legislature in violation of the state constitution and compelling that
body to fulfill its constitutional duty to approve a balanced budget by a time
certain. "'
The issues raised in Governor Guinn's petition presented the court with
conflicting provisions of the Nevada Constitution whose import came to a head
during the 2003 session of the Nevada Legislature, when the state faced serious
financial shortfalls. 4 9 After the legislature failed in its regular session and two
special sessions to produce agreement on a balanced budget,' 5 ° Governor
Guinn petitioned the court, and the court acted.15" ' It ruled that Article XI,
Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution, which requires adequate funding of pub-
lic education, trumped Article IV, Section 18(2)'s requirement of a two-thirds
majority of both houses of the legislature to pass a tax increase."'5 Shearing
joined five of her colleagues in the majority decision.' 5 3
In Guinn 11, the court's decision on the rehearing petition filed by
aggrieved legislators,' 54 Shearing agreed with the court's ruling, but disagreed
as to its reasoning.' 15 5 Her narrower ruling would have denied the petition for
rules "for the conduct of its hearings and any other procedural rules it deems necessary to
carry out its duties." Id. (citing NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21(7)).
142 See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Supermajority Provisions, Guinn v. Legislature, and a
Flawed Constitutional Structure, 4 NEV. L.J. 491, 495 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Most
Rational Branch: Guinn v. Legislature and the Judiciary's Role As Helpful Arbiter of Con-
flict, 4 NEV. L.J. 518, 518-19 (2003).
143 Guinn 1, 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), affd on reh'g, Guinn H, 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003).
Governor Guinn sought mandamus relief, asking the court to declare the Nevada legisla-
ture's failure to pass a balanced budget a violation of the Nevada Constitution. Id. at 1272.
'" Stempel, supra note 142, at 518-19.
145 Johnson, supra note 142, at 495 (citing K.C. Howard, Activists to Target Six Justices,
LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 18, 2003, at IA).
146 Id. (citing Ed Vogel, Seeking Signatures: Referendum on Tax Repeal in the Works, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 12, 2003, at 2B; Editorial: Feel-Good Politics that Don't Work, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 24, 2003, at 2D).
147 Stempel, supra note 142, at 519 n.4.
148 Guinn 1, 71 P.3d at 1272.
149 See, e.g., id.
150 See Guinn H, 76 P.3d 22, 27-28 (Nev. 2003).
15' Guinn 1, 71 P.3d at 1271-72.
152 Id. at 1275-76. The court reached that result by characterizing the Article 4 requirement
as a "procedural" provision, which must yield to the "substantive" mandate of Article 11.
Id.
153 Id. at 1276. See id. (Maupin, J., dissenting).
154 76 P.3d at 25. Only individual legislators petitioned for rehearing; the Legislature did
not join in the petition. See id.
155 Id. at 33 (Shearing, J., concurring).
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rehearing based on its failure, by simply rehashing old arguments, to conform
to the standards for such petitions set out in Rule 40(c) of the Nevada Rules of
Appellate Procedure.' 5 6 Shearing also took issue with the court's attempt to
answer public criticism'5 7 and defend its own criticism of the state's constitu-
tion and laws.' Reflecting her strong views on separation of powers and the
role of the judiciary,' 5 9 Shearing stated:
We must accept the duly enacted constitution and laws of this state, whether they are
well advised or ill advised; the court's duty is to decide the cases brought before it.
Often that duty involves trying to reconcile provisions that, in practical application,
produce results that are incompatible with one another. The court has accomplished
that reconciliation in this case. That should end the matter.
16 0
For Shearing, Guinn was simply another case the court had a duty to
decide, an important case to be sure, but just a case, not the occasion for a
political manifesto.
In the years between Whitehead and Guinn the court faced other, often
politically sensitive, decisional challenges. Comments on a few of those cases
further illustrate Shearing's respect for democratic ideals and the high standards
to which she holds the judiciary and those serving on the bench.
In Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 16 1 the court examined a controversial bal-
lot initiative that would have amended the Nevada Constitution to impose term
limits on the elected judiciary.' 62  Petitioners sought to have the measure
removed from the ballot, complaining, first, that it violated the people's right to
vote for candidates of their choice and incumbent judges' right to continue in
office and, second, that it failed to state with clarity its effect on judges.' 63 By
156 Id. at 33-34 (concluding that petition for rehearing "is not appropriate" under any provi-
sion of NEV. R. App. P. 40(c)).
'7 Id. at 34. Shearing's thinking here echoed her dissent in Whitehead IV where she dis-
agreed "wholeheartedly with the majority view that this court should respond to the com-
ments and criticisms of the media." 893 P.2d 866, 966 (Nev. 1995). Shearing
acknowledged the sting of media criticism felt by any public official, but believed that any
desire to explain and defend oneself must yield to that most important of media responsibili-
ties: their duty to the public "to report on the actions of public officials and to criticize them
if necessary." Id. In the words of United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger, "[i]t is assumed that judges will ignore the public glamour or media reports and editori-
als in reaching their decisions and by tradition will not respond [react] to public
commentary." Id. at 967 (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 838 (1978)).
158 Guinn I, 71 P.3d at 34.
'59 See, e.g., Schoels v. State, 966 P.2d 735, 741-42 (Nev. 1998) (Shearing, J., concurring)
(She wrote separately to address dissenting justice's assertion that prosecutors had adopted
practice of seeking death penalty purely for tactical advantage, and stating, "this court must
respect the doctrine of separation of powers. The judiciary may not invade the legitimate
function of the prosecutor. Charging decisions are primarily a matter of discretion for the
prosecution, which represents the executive branch of government.").
160 Guinn 11, 76 P.3d at 34.
161 910 P.2d 898 (Nev. 1996).
162 Id. at 899.
163 Id. at 900. The ballot initiative included term limits for legislators and state and local
government officials as well, but judicial positions received no explanation of the maximum
years of service allowed, whereas the other positions contained that information. Id. at 903.
As to judges, the explanation stated only that "judges would be limited to two (2) terms." Id.
While "two terms" would amount to a twelve-year maximum under Article 6, section 20(2),
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the time the petitioners' challenge reached the Nevada Supreme Court, the vot-
ers had approved the measure in the 1994 election.164 The initiative's success
did not moot the challenge, however, because the Nevada Constitution requires
voter approval of proposed constitutional amendments in two successive elec-
tions.' 65 Thus, the issue was very much alive when the supreme court ruled in
early 1996, well in advance of election day. 166
The court upheld the constitutionality of the ballot initiative, 167 but agreed
with the petitioners that the language in the explanation of the measure's effect
was not a model of clarity. 1 68 To remedy that problem, the court severed the
initiative into two separate questions and even went so far as to specify the
precise language to be used in the initiative's explanation of its effect on
judges. 169
While Shearing agreed that the initiative was constitutional, she dissented
from the severance order; she believed the court had gone too far when it
accepted the challenge to the initiative's purportedly faulty explanation.1 7 °
Two rationales supported her dissent. First, the initiative's explanation was
both accurate and in compliance with the statutory requirements that it be "in
easily understood language and of reasonable length." ''  Second, the court
overstepped its bounds and trod on the rights of voters when it examined the
question's language and issued the severance order, complete with revised lan-
guage. 172 The proper remedy, to Shearing's mind, was crystal clear: "I submit
that the question as presented to the voters in the 1994-95 election should either
be upheld as satisfactory or struck down as defective." 173 Shearing was une-
quivocal in stating that, once the voters approved the initiative, the court was
not at liberty to change it; its only choices were to approve it as written or
require a new question and explanation to be placed on the ballot and passed in
two consecutive elections.1 74
Returning to a related concern of the state's high court, judicial discipline,
brings us to the all-too-public tale of Eighth Judicial District Judge Donald
Mosley's battle for custody of his young son175 and the ensuing ethics probe of
Mosley. 176 In mid-1999, more than two years after Mosley prevailed in his
of the Nevada Constitution, under certain circumstances a judge actually might serve far less
than that, given the constitution's electoral requirements. See id.
164 Id. at 900.
165 See NEv. CONST. art. XIX, § 2(4), which provides: "If a majority of such voters votes
approval of such amendment, the secretary of state shall publish and resubmit the question of
approval or disapproval to a vote of the voters at the next succeeding general election in the
same manner as such question was originally submitted."
166 See Nev. Judges Ass'n, 910 P.2d at 898.
167 Id. at 903.
168 See id. at 904.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 904-05 (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.250(5) (2004).
172 Nev. Judges Ass'n., 910 P.2d at 904.
173 Id. at 905.
174 Id.
175 See infra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Carri Geer Thevenot, Ruling Throws Out Lawsuit by Judge, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Feb. 16, 2005, at 4B; Ed Vogel, Court Upholds Mosley Fine, Censure, LAS VEGAS REv.-
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efforts to regain joint custody of his son,' 77 the Las Vegas Review-Journal
published two articles accusing Mosley of using his judicial office to benefit his
custody pursuit.' 7 8 After investigation, the Nevada Commission on Judicial
Discipline instituted formal disciplinary proceedings against Mosley.' 79 The
Commission charged Mosley with eleven violations of the Nevada Code of
Judicial Conduct and, at the conclusion of a three-day evidentiary hearing,
found violations relating to seven counts,' 80 dismissed the remaining four
counts,' 8 1 and sanctioned Mosley.' 82
On Mosley's appeal, Shearing wrote for a divided court.' 83 Applying the
deferential "clear and convincing evidence" standard required for review of
such findings, 84 the plurality upheld, for the most part,185 the Commission's
J., Dec. 22, 2004, at 4B; Peter O'Connell, Judge Says Actions Not Violations, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., May 4, 2000, at 1B; Caren Benjamin, Complaint Targets Judge in Custody Fight,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 27, 1999, at 1B; Cy Ryan, Judge's Custody Battle Stays in Reno
Court, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sept. 9, 1997, at 6A; Cy Ryan, Judge Escalates Custody Battle, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 26, 1997, at 5A.
177 See Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 930 P.2d 1110 (Nev. 1997).
178 See Peter O'Connell, Felon: Judge Reneged on Deal, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., April 24,
1999, at 1B (saying Mosley agreed to be lenient in sentencing felony defendant in exchange
for testimony damaging to mother of Mosley's son); Peter O'Connell, Man Released from
Jail After Judge Intercedes for Friend, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., August 13, 1999, at 7B (charg-
ing Mosley with releasing on his own recognizance criminal defendant whose friend testified
for Mosley at custody hearing).
179 See Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 22 P.3d 655, 658 (Nev. 2001).
Mosley moved to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings, claiming violation of his due process
rights, id. at 659, and an unconstitutional delegation of authority by the State Bar Board of
Governors in the appointment of two Commission members. Id. at 661. The majority
rejected Mosley's due process argument, id., but agreed that the Bar had acted outside its
constitutional authority and remanded for the proper appointment of two new Commission
members. Id. at 663. Justice Shearing, joined by Justice Agosti, disagreed that the Bar's
actions violated the constitution and instead found those actions "fully in keeping with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution." Id. at 663-64 (Shearing, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
8o In re Mosley, 102 P.3d 555, 558 (Nev. 2004) (two counts of improper personal use of
judicial letterhead, three counts of improper ex parte communications, one count of ordering
release of jail detainee without notifying district attorney, and one count of improperly fail-
ing to recuse himself from criminal case until after defendant had testified in Mosley's cus-
tody case).
181 Id. (three counts of improper ex parte communications and one count of improperly
assisting criminal defendant's wife in obtaining extrajudicial relief).
182 Id. (requiring Mosley to attend ethics course at National Judicial College at his own
expense, fining him $5000, and ordering issuance of "strongly worded censures for violating
ethical rules").
183 Id. at 557. The decision did not command a majority, but only a plurality. Justice
Agosti joined Justice Shearing's opinion in its entirety, id. at 566, but the remaining five
justices wrote three separate minority opinions. See id. at 566 (Maupin, J., joined by Becker,
J., and Puccinelli, D.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 567 (Rose, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 558-59 ("[Tlhe constitution confines the scope of appellate review of the commis-
sion's factual findings to a determination of whether the evidence in the record as a whole
provides clear and convincing support for the commission's findings. The commission's
factual findings may not be disregarded merely because the circumstances involved might
also be reasonably reconciled with contrary findings of fact.").
185 See id.
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findings.18 6 The court agreed that Mosley acted improperly in using judicial
letterhead for personal business, 187 conducting ex parte communications with a
criminal defense attorney concerning damaging information her client had
about the mother of Mosley's child,' 88 and recusing himself from the criminal
case only after the defendant testified for Mosley in his hard-fought custody
hearing.' 89 By those actions, the court concluded, Mosley "was using his posi-
tion for personal advantage, thereby diminishing public confidence in the integ-
rity and impartiality of the judiciary."' 9 °
The Shearing plurality did not, however, find clear and convincing evi-
dence of unethical practices in Mosley's release of a man from detention fol-
lowing ex parte communications with the man's former employer, who was a
personal friend of Mosley.' 9 ' Testimony at the Commission hearing revealed
that what Mosley had done was "within the spirit of [a] local practice" in which
the district attorney's office had acquiesced for over thirty years.' 9 2 While fair-
ness to Mosley dictated reversal of the Commission's findings concerning his
adoption of that practice, Shearing's opinion left no doubt that the court would
not be so forgiving of future violators.' 9 3
Shearing's care in distinguishing between improper and merely unsavory
conduct and her championing of fairness to the accused 194 exemplifies her role
186 Id. at 558.
187 Id. at 560 (upholding Commission's finding that Mosley improperly used judicial letter-
head for personal business; Mosley wrote letters to principals at son's school asking them to
prohibit boy's mother from visiting him there.). This was an issue of first impression for the
court. Canon 2B of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited in general terms any
use of "the prestige of a judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or
others," id. at 559, but did not explicitly address the judicial letterhead issue. The commen-
tary to Canon 2B, however, stated succinctly that "judicial letterhead must not be used for
conducting personal business." Id. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court
in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988), the Shearing
court adopted a "reasonable person" standard for interpreting the canon and rejected Mos-
ley's argument that he could not have been advancing his personal position because the
school principals already knew he was a judge. Id. at 559-60.
188 Id. at 563 (upholding Commission's finding that Mosley improperly conducted ex parte
communications with lawyer for criminal defendant assigned to Mosley; defendant had dam-
aging, and thereby helpful, information about mother of Mosley's son, Mosley's antagonist
in custody battle).
189 Id. at 564 (upholding Commission's finding that Mosley, who was known as a tough
sentencing judge, improperly delayed recusing himself from criminal defendant's case,
which suggested he wanted to assure he would get favorable testimony before acting on
defendant's behalf).
190 Id. at 564.
'9' Id. at 560.
192 Id. at 561-62.
193 Id. at 562 n.12 ("Although we reverse the findings of the Commission in this instance,
nothing in our decision should be read to suggest the judges in Clark County may continue
[such] practices.").
'9' See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 998 P.2d 557 (Nev. 2000) (reversing conviction of defendant
where trial court allowed prosecution to amend indictment after defendant had testified;
defendant had fundamental right to notice of charges against him; his primary defense and
decision whether to testify might have been different had he received timely notice of prose-
cution's new theory); Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1998) (remanding for resentenc-
ing; judge violated defendants' due process rights when he commented on their "illegal
immigrant" status and thereby created inference that their nationality negatively impacted his
Fall 2005]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
in the court's oversight of the judiciary and practicing bar. Thus, Shearing
joined the majority, over the strenuous dissent of two colleagues, 19 5 in granting
a bar applicant's petition for waiver of a supreme court rule prohibiting him
from reapplying for bar admission after once failing to meet the bar's character
and fitness requirements.' 96 The court concluded that the State Board of Bar
Examiners, which recommended approval of the applicant, was in a far better
position than the court to make such determinations, and the record before the
Board supported its recommendation of admission.19 7 The applicant's partici-
pation as an airplane pilot in an illicit marijuana smuggling scheme ten years
earlier "should not brand him forever,"' 9 8 particularly when he voluntarily
withdrew from the activity before entering law school and thereafter cooperated
with federal officials in unraveling the conspiracy. 99
Similarly, Shearing's respect for the record and for the professional lives
of individual members of the bar and judiciary led to her refusal, in a number of
decisions, to consider allegations of bias which the record before the court did
not support. In two cases, the Shearing majority rejected litigants' efforts to
disqualify a sitting justice from participating in their appeals, refusing either to
allow a "judicial fishing expedition '20 0 or to interfere with "the independence
of Nevada's judiciary ' 2 1 on the basis of unsupported allegations. In another
case, Shearing's majority opinion rejected the conflict of interest arguments of
an unsuccessful candidate for the State Commission on Judicial Selection
because, while the situation he posited "could present a potential conflict of
interest on the part of a Commission member selected, no such situation is
presented here."
'10 2
A further pair of cases reveals Shearing's conception of the powerful, but
limited, place of the judiciary in our tripartite system of government. The
sentencing decision); Silva v. State, 951 P.2d 591, 596 (Nev. 1997) (Shearing, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing with reversal of conviction, but writing separately to emphasize unfairness to
defendant when prosecutor called witness who he knew would refuse to testify and then
focused on that refusal in closing argument; prosecutor was encouraging jury to draw infer-
ence against defendant based on witness's refusal to testify, when defendant had no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine witness); Norwood v. State, 915 P.2d 277 (Nev. 1996) (remanding
for resentencing based on judge's unsubstantiated and prejudicial reference to defendant as
Crips gang leader).
"I In re Birmingham, 866 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1994) (Steffen, J., and Rose, C.J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 1150.
197 Id. at 1151-52.
198 Id. at 1151.
199 See id.
200 Hogan v. Warden, 916 P.2d 805, 810 (1996) (denying habeas petitioner's request for
discovery of any informal disciplinary proceedings against judges before whom he had
appeared; petitioner argued request was justified by revelation in Whitehead proceedings of
"secret" disciplinary arrangements for some judges).
21 Martin v. Beck, 915 P.2d 898, 899 (Nev. 1996) (denying appellant's motion to disqual-
ify on bias grounds sitting justice who had filed perjury complaint against appellant's coun-
sel; motion was both procedurally deficient because it lacked required attorney's certificate
and without substantive merit).
202 O'Brien v. State Bar of Nev., 952 P.2d 952, 955 (1998) (emphasis added) (rejecting
petitioner's assertion that Board member who might be considered for nomination to fill
judicial vacancy should be disqualified from participating in the selection of Commission
members).
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court's unanimous decision in Blackjack Bonding v. City of Las Vegas Munici-
pal Court20 3 displays Shearing's robust view of the powers of the judiciary qua
judiciary. In contrast, her partial concurrence and dissent in City of Las Vegas
v. Eighth Judicial District Court2° 4 illustrates her adherence to a time-honored
limitation on the court's powers, to wit: that the court should strike down a
statute as unconstitutional only as a matter of last resort.2 °5
In Blackjack Bonding, bail bondsmen challenged the Las Vegas Municipal
Court's assessment of bail bond filing fees, claiming the court lacked the neces-
sary statutory authorization to assess the fees.2 °6 The Shearing court disagreed,
ruling that municipal courts possess the authority to collect reasonable fees
under "the separation of powers doctrine and the power inherent in a court by
virtue of its sheer existence. '20 7  "Without inherent powers to perform its
duties, the judiciary would become a subordinate branch of government, which
is contrary to the central tenet of separation of powers."20 8 Moreover, the
power inherent by virtue of the "sheer existence" of a court "is broader and
more fundamental. '2 9 The court concluded that both sources of inherent judi-
cial power authorized the municipal courts to assess filing fees for bail
bonds. 10
The statute at issue in City of Las Vegas provided that "a person who
annoys or molests a minor is guilty of a misdemeanor."2"1 The district court
declared it unconstitutionally void for vagueness, and the supreme court upheld
the lower court's action.21 2 The majority concluded that the terms "annoy" and
203 14 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 2000).
204 59 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2002).
205 See, e.g., Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 90 (Nev. 2001) (Shearing, J., dissenting) (rejecting
majority decision declaring unconstitutional criminal insanity statute, based on maxim that
where statute is susceptible to both constitutional and unconstitutional interpretations, court
must construe statute so as not to violate constitution), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
206 Blackjack Bonding, 14 P.3d at 1278.
207 Id. at 1279.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. This was so even though municipal courts are created by statute, not by the constitu-
tion, as the court had ruled earlier that year in Nunez v. City of North Las Vegas, 1 P.3d 959
(Nev. 2000). There, the court held that once established, municipal courts are part of the
constitutional judicial system of the state and "enjoy the inherent powers of all constitution-
ally created courts." Id. at 962. Given that ruling and the legislature's jurisdictional grant of
power over bail and property bonds to municipal courts, the Blackjack Bonding decision was
a natural extension of fundamental principles, and not a great leap forward, in keeping with
Shearing's incremental approach to development of the law.
211 59 P.3d at 479; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.260 (1995). During the pendency of the
constitutional challenge, the legislature amended the statute to read:
Unless a greater penalty is provided by specific statute, a person who annoys or molests or
attempts to annoy or molest a minor, including, without limitation, soliciting a minor to engage
in unlawful sexual conduct, is guilty of: (a) For the first offense, a misdemeanor, (b) For the
second and each subsequent offense, a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more
than 6 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.
2001 Nev. Stat. 2789 (amended language in italics). The current language of section
207.260 reflects further amendments made in the 2003 legislative session. See 2003 Nev.
Stat. 1377.
212 59 P.3d at 483.
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"molest" had essentially the same meaning, and because "annoy" was too
vague to provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct, the statute was unconsti-
tutionally void on its face.2 13 Shearing concurred with the result, but dissented
from the majority's facial unconstitutionality ruling.2 14 She agreed that the
statutorily proscribed conduct of "annoying a minor" was unconstitutionally
vague, but disagreed with the majority's treatment of "annoy" and "molest" as
synonyms.2 15 The dictionary definition of "molest" cited by the majority,
Shearing noted, included a requirement of "hostile intent or injurious effect,"
which added a component of mens rea not present in the definition of
"annoy. '  The statute therefore criminalized not just one, but two forms of
conduct. Here, the prosecutor had charged the defendant only with "annoying"
the victim, not with "molesting" her.21 7 Thus, the court could (and should)
have held the statute unconstitutional only as applied to the defendant, not on
its face.2 18
A final cluster of cases illustrates Shearing's adherence to well-defined
principles of judicial review. For example, Shearing's respect for the role of
the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature undergirded her approach to the court's
review of cases seeking to enlarge upon, or otherwise modify, legislative reme-
dies. Thus, a Shearing majority declined to recognize a claim for wrongful
discharge based on racial discrimination against an employer with fewer than
fifteen employees. 2 9 That was for the legislature, not the court, to deteriine:
"Although we recognize that racial discrimination is fundamentally wrong and
undoubtedly against Nevada's public policy, we are constrained by the legisla-
ture's decision to address the issue through legislation and to provide statutory
remedies for only certain employees. ' 220
Similarly, Shearing advocated deference to trial court rulings in cases
involving decisions committed to the discretion of those bodies. For example,
writing for the majority, Shearing found no manifest abuse of discretion in the
district court's denial of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA")'s motion for a change of venue in the suit by former Runnin'
Rebels basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian alleging the NCAA had forced him
out of college basketball. 22 ' The Shearing court found substantial evidence to
support the lower court ruling: the judge had heard testimony from both par-
ties' experts concerning the effect on the jury pool of inflammatory pretrial
213 Id. (stating statute was unconstitutional under both the Nevada and United States
Constitutions).
214 Id. (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Chavez v. Sievers, 43 P.3d 1022 (Nev. 2002).
220 Id. at 1025-26; see also Nev. Power Co. v. Haggerty, 989 P.2d 870, 879 (Nev. 1999)
(Shearing, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority's affirmance of dismissal of Nevada
Power Company's third-party complaint and claim of immunity after worker was injured by
electrical power line, and emphasizing role of legislature in defining statutory terms).
221 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 939 P.2d 1049 (Nev. 1997).
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publicity some years earlier, and it had found the analysis of the NCAA's
experts both outdated and unreliable. 2
Shearing accorded jury verdicts the same deference. In a state condemna-
tion action for the expansion of Interstate 15 in central Las Vegas, the jury
awarded lessees who operated a franchise gasoline station and convenience
store far less than the lessees claimed the property was worth.22 3 Shearing
wrote for the majority in affirming the jury award of $260,000, and not the $1.6
to $1.8 million opined to by the lessees' testifying expert.22 4 The Shearing
court explained:
[T]he jury was free to disbelieve that testimony, particularly since part of it was
based on inappropriate factors such as lost business income and lost business oppor-
tunity. Other evidence, including the purchase price five years earlier, suggested a
lower value. Consequently, the district court did not err in entering judgment on the
jury's verdict. 225
In another case, the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to
two men who alleged they were fired in retaliation for objecting to their
employer's racially discriminatory rental policies.226  Dissenting from the
majority's reversal of the jury award, Shearing found substantial evidence to
support the jury and disputed the majority's "unduly restrictive" view of tor-
tious discharge actions.2 27
But Shearing did not hesitate to reverse lower court decisions that were
not entitled to deference on appeal. A pair of tort cases is illustrative.
A water park user who suffered a broken hip when he slipped on one of
the park's slides sued for negligence. 22 8 During discovery, the plaintiff learned
that the water park had a policy of destroying its first aid logs at the end of each
season, and at trial he proffered a jury instruction that would have allowed the
jury to draw an inference that the unavailable logs would have been unfavora-
ble to the water park.22 ' The trial court refused to give the instruction, based
on its conclusion that the water park had not intended to willfully suppress the
logs, 230 and the jury ruled against the plaintiff.23 1 The Shearing court reversed:
222 See id. at 1051-52. See also Pombo v. Nev. Apartment Ass'n, 938 P.2d 725 (Nev. 1997)
(finding no abuse of discretion and therefore affirming trial court's dismissal, following
bench trial, of former executive director's breach of contract and related tort claims against
association); Nelson v. Peckham Plaza P'ships, 866 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1994) (finding no man-
ifest abuse of discretion by trial court because substantial evidence supported award of dam-
ages against lessees for negligent removal of equipment at end of lease term); Tropicana
Hotel Corp. v. Speer, 692 P.2d 499, 502 (Nev. 1985) (Shearing, D.J., dissenting) (finding
substantial evidence to support trial court's ruling, in bench trial, for employee on breach of
oral contract claim where majority impermissibly substituted its factual findings for those of
the trial judge).
223 State Dep't of Transp. v. Cowan, 103 P.3d I (Nev. 2004).
224 Id. at 6.
225 Id.
226 Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 631 (Nev. 1995).
227 Id. at 637 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
228 Reingold v. Wet 'N Wild Nev., Inc., 944 P.2d 80 (Nev. 1997).
229 Id. at 802.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 801 (assessing eighty percent fault against plaintiff and only twenty percent
against waterpark).
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The district court apparently believed that "willful suppression" requires more than
following the company's normal records destruction policy. We disagree. It appears
that this records destruction policy was deliberately designed to prevent production
of records in any subsequent litigation. Deliberate destruction of records before the
statute of limitations has run on the incidents described in those records amounts to
suppression of evidence. If Wet 'N' Wild chooses such a records destruction policy,
it must accept the adverse inferences of the policy.
2 3 2
In another tort case, a Shearing majority reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment against a woman who claimed negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress after witnessing the adverse effects on her mother of negligently
dispensed prescription medication. 233 The Shearing court rejected Nevada's
historical limitation of such claims to bystander witnesses of automobile acci-
dents and, instead, relied on the basic tort law principle of foreseeability.2
34
Here, the daughter had purchased prescription medications for her mother and
properly administered them "until her mother was rendered comatose.'"235
Shearing rejected the trial court's legal conclusions, sent the case back for a
jury trial, and summed up: "In effect, because of the pharmacist's negligence,
the daughter poisoned her mother. Under these circumstances, it was entirely
foreseeable that the drug would significantly harm the actual patient and that a
close relative would continue administration until the ultimate catastrophic
effect was realized. 2 36
The cases discussed here confirm the characterization of Justice Shearing
as a minimalist on questions concerning the role of the judiciary. Not one to
diminish the essential roles and great powers of the judiciary, Shearing
endorsed the equally essential limits on the court's power mandated by separa-
tion of powers and principles of judicial and appellate review. In every case,
Shearing's opinion demonstrated her commitment to deciding the case on the
facts presented and going no further, even when that meant she was the lone
dissenter.
C. Children's Rights
During her years on the bench, Justice Shearing distinguished herself as a
champion of children's rights. She ceaselessly stressed the "best interests" of
the child, a term to which her opinions added new depth of meaning. Shear-
ing's work in this arena is notable for its blending of a practical understanding
of the complexities of contemporary family life with a faithful adherence to the
232 Id. at 802.
233 Crippens v. Say-On Drug Stores, 961 P.2d 761 (Nev. 1998). See also Woosley v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 18 P.3d 317 (Nev. 2001) (reversing trial court's denial of insured's motion for
new trial in breach of contract action to recover uninsured motorist benefits because trial
court abused its discretion by failing to give res ipsa loquitur instruction and giving errone-
ous comparative negligence instruction); Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 418 (Nev. 1999)
(Shearing, J., dissenting) (disapproving trial court's dismissal of "bystander" emotional dis-
tress claim brought by injured accident victim's fianc& fact-finder should have opportunity
to assess nature of relationship between plaintiff and victim; excluding fianc6 from definition
of "closely related person" elevated form over substance).
234 961 P.2d at 763.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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people's will, as expressed through the child protection laws and related enact-
ments of the state legislature. So, too, her decisions outside the "best interests"
realm reveal her deep understanding of the young's particular vulnerabilities
and her abiding respect for their rights. We turn first to the "best interests"
cases.
The right of a child to have his custody, care and control decided based on
his or her "best interests" is the cornerstone of judicial determinations concern-
ing termination of parental rights237 and child custody. 238 The seminal deci-
sion on "best interests" in termination proceedings is In re Termination of
Parental Rights as to N.J.,239 in which a unanimous court overruled Cham-
pagne v. Welfare Decision240 and the line of cases following it.241' Based on its
interpretation of the governing statute, N.R.S. § 128.105, Champagne required
a finding of parental fault before considering the best interests of the child; if
the evidence failed to establish that the parents were at fault, the child's best
interests were not to be addressed.242 Displeased with Champagne, the legisla-
ture acted quickly to shift the primary focus from the parents' conduct to the
child's best interests.24 3 Despite that amendment and a further legislative clari-
fication in 19 9 5 ,2' 4 district court judges, often with the blessing of the supreme
court, continued to require a finding of parental fault before considering the
child's best interests. 24 ' Those cases, the N.J. court said, improperly placed
"too much emphasis on the conduct of the parents instead of on the best inter-
ests of the child. ' 246  "[T]he statute clearly provides that when deciding
whether to terminate parental rights, the district court must always consider the
best interests of the child in conjunction with a finding of parental neglect. 2 47
237 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105 (2004).
238 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(1) (2004).
239 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000).
240 691 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1984).
241 See In re Parental Rights as to Carron, 956 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1998); In re Parental Rights
as to Daniels, 953 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1998); Cooley v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 946 P.2d
155 (Nev. 1997); In re Parental Rights as to Gonzales, 933 P.2d 198 (Nev. 1997); In re
Parental Rights as to Bow, 930 P.2d 1128 (Nev. 1997); In re Parental Rights as to Weinper,
918 P.2d 325 (Nev. 1996); Scalf v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 801 P.2d 1359 (Nev.
1990); Smith v. Smith, 720 P.2d 1219 (Nev. 1986); Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986);
McGuire v. Welfare Div., 697 P.2d 479 (Nev. 1985).
242 691 P.2d at 854.
243 See In re N.J. 8 P.3d at 131. The amendment changed the introductory sentence in the
statute to provide: "[A]n order of the court for termination of parental rights must be made
... with the initial and primary consideration being whether the best interests of the child
would be served by the termination, but requiring a finding [of parental fault]." Id. (citing
1987 Nev. Stat. 210). The court noted that the legislative history showed that the primary
purpose of the amendment was to put children's rights and parents' rights on equal footing
and require their consideration together. Id.
244 Id. The 1995 amendment again revised the statute's introductory language, to state:
"The primary consideration in any proceeding to terminate parental rights must be whether
the best interests of the child will be served by the termination." Id. (citing 1995 Nev. Stat.
215).
245 Id. at 131-32.
246 Id. at 132.
247 Id. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 128.105 (2) (2004) (Listing that "parental neglect" is not the
only grounds for termination of parental rights; additional grounds include abandonment,
parental unfitness or failure to adjust, and risk of injury to the child).
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Although Shearing did not author the N.J. opinion,2 48 her earlier decisions
had laid the groundwork for it. Shearing's contributions to the best interests
analysis in the form of published opinions began with her 1995 majority deci-
sion in Greeson v. Barnes.249 Over a vigorous dissent,2  the Shearing major-
ity upheld the district court's termination of a father's parental rights based on
his abandonment of his young son.2 5 ' The court found in the trial court's
review of the evidence concerning the father's true intentions "no better illus-
tration of the adage 'actions speak louder than words.' "252 The court
explained: "When a parent fails to pay child support for five years and makes
virtually no gesture demonstrative of real care and concern for the child, subse-
quent pleas of a lack of intent to abandon the child ring hollow. '25 3 Thus,
Shearing employed the deferential standard regularly applied to appellate
review of factual findings: "This court has no basis for contesting the findings
of the district court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
judge their credibility. 254
A pair of decisions issued during a two-week period in late 1996 and early
1997 further cemented the primacy of the best interests of the child in termina-
tion decisions. In the first case, Bush v. State Dept of Human Resources,25 5 the
Shearing court upheld the termination of a mentally deficient couple's parental
rights based on clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best
interests of their two sons.2 56 Shearing did not assign blame to the parents and
instead noted that they "love their children and have made some efforts toward
becoming better parents. 25 7 However, in light of the boys' special needs,
"which would daunt an above-average parent, ' 25 8 the parents' mental defi-
ciency rendered them unable to care for their children. 259 The court refused to
248 8 P.3d at 127 (Agosti, J.).
249 900 P.2d 943 (Nev. 1995).
250 See id. at 948 (Springer, J., dissenting). Springer's view, which he voiced repeatedly in
dissenting from termination affirmances, is that the United States Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of parenthood as a "fundamental liberty interest," in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), is controlling. See id. at 949 (Springer, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 947.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 948. See also In re Montgomery, 917 P.2d 949, 957 (Nev. 1996) (Shearing, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority that insufficient evidence of parental unfitness existed
to terminate mother's rights, where mother had chronic alcohol problem that trial court con-
cluded was "irremediable"; best interests of child dictated result even if unfair to mother,
who had shown stability in recent months).
255 929 P.2d 940 (Nev. 1996).
256 Id. But see id. at 946 (Springer, J., dissenting) (complaining broadly of the court's
"onslaughts on the poor and the handicapped").
257 Id. at 942. Justice Shearing candidly acknowledged that the Bush decision was very
difficult because both the children and their parents were plagued by circumstances beyond
their control. In the end, though, it was the children whose interests were paramount under
the law, even when that meant that their parents would lose them through no fault of their
own. Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
258 Id.
259 See id.
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compromise the children's development "for the sake of the parents." 260
"While the parents' right to retain their children is an important consideration
in the analysis, the rights of the children to a stable future with a loving family
must be paramount. "261
Shearing wrote a separate concurrence in the second case, In re Parental
Rights as to Bow,2 62 in which the court upheld the termination of an indigent
Native American mother's rights to her young son. 263 Shearing agreed with the
majority's reasoning and result, but wrote separately to respond to the dis-
sent. 264 Shearing abandoned her characteristic dispassionate assessment of the
case to take issue with her colleague Springer's accusation that the State
appeared "'to be intent on dissolving the families of the poor, powerless, and
handicapped.' ,265 Not so, Shearing stated: "In each case affirmed by this
court, the parental rights were terminated because the parent or parents irrefuta-
bly demonstrated their inability to care for their children."26 6 Referring to her
experience on the criminal trial bench, Shearing provided a rare insight into her
personal thought processes:
The overwhelming majority of defendants who have appeared before me for sentenc-
ing were subject to abuse and neglect as children. By terminating parental rights in
appropriate cases, I hope that we are in the process of breaking the pattern by provid-
ing safe, loving homes to the children who are tomorrow's parents.
267
Thus, "termination shows compassion for children by not condemning them to
live with abusive and neglectful parents.' 268
As with proceedings for termination of parental rights, child custody in
dissolution of marriage actions is governed by a statutory "best interests of the
child" standard.269 The weight to be accorded those interests is even stronger
here, however; it is not just the primary consideration, but "the sole considera-
tion. ' '270 In her child custody decisions, Shearing took the statutory language
260 Id. The Shearing court agreed with the trial court's "dismay" that the boys had been in
foster care for over five years (since one was ten months old and the other, two years old).
Id. The court also noted that the boys' foster mother had stated that, if they were free for
adoption, she and her husband would adopt them. ld.
261 Id.
262 930 P.2d 1128 (Nev. 1997), overruled on other grounds by In re Termination of Parental
Rights as to N.J, 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000).
263 See id. at 1129-30.
264 Id. at 1134 (Shearing, J., concurring).
265 Id. See also In re Parental Rights as to Daniels, 953 P.2d 1, 10 (Nev. 1998) (Springer,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Shearing majority decision upholding termination of paren-
tal fights based, as he viewed it, on parents' "destitution and poverty").
266 In re Parental Rights as to Bow, 930 P.2d at 1134.
267 ld. at 1135.
268 Id.
269 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(1) (2004), amended by 2005 Nev. Stat. 1677-82 (retain-
ing "best interests" focus).
270 See id. "In determining custody of a minor child in an action brought under this chapter,
the sole consideration is the best interest of the child." Id.
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seriously, whether her adherence to it placed her with the majority2 7 1 or
required a separate concurrence2 72 or dissent.2 7 3
The hotly contested battle for custody of the son of Eighth Judicial District
Court Judge Donald Mosley2 74 illustrates Shearing's commitment to the pri-
macy of the child's "best interests." Based on the detailed findings of the trial
court, Shearing refused to join in the majority decision reversing the trial
court's award of custody to the child's mother and awarding custody to Mos-
ley. 275 After stating that "the district's court's foremost concern is the welfare
of the child, ' 276 Shearing noted that "the court made extensive findings which
fully justify its conclusion and order. '277 The lower court had concluded that
the child "would be safer, more warmly loved and more daily nurtured with the
mother, in the mother's home."' 2 78 There being no clear abuse of the court's
discretion, Shearing would have affirmed its order.2 79
While Shearing's concern for the particular vulnerabilities of the young
permeates her termination and custody decisions, it reveals itself most promi-
nently in cases involving child sexual abuse and related crimes. Shortly before
Shearing joined the court, the nation was rocked by the infamous McMartin
271 See Halbrook v. Halbrook, 971 P.2d 1262 (Nev. 1998) (reversing and remanding denial
of former wife's relocation motion; her increased career opportunities constituted good faith
reason for request, and her alternative visitation plan was reasonable); Blaich v. Blaich, 971
P.2d 822 (Nev. 1998) (reversing and remanding; trial court erred in concluding it had to
award former wife primary custody of children before addressing her motion to relocate);
Davis v. Davis, 970 P.2d 1084 (Nev. 1998) (affirming trial court's denial of former wife's
motion to relocate to Florida; former wife had sensible good faith reason for move, but move
would not permit former husband, a firefighter, reasonable visitation); McGuiness v. McGui-
ness, 970 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1998) (reversing and remanding for consideration of former
wife's relocation motion, noting that wellbeing of parent may substantially affect best inter-
ests of child); McDermott v. McDermott, 946 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997) (reversing and remand-
ing district court's change of primary custody from mother to father, based on statutory
presumption against awarding custody to perpetrator of domestic violence, which lower
court had not considered).
272 See Mack v. Ashlock, 921 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Nev. 1996) (Shearing, J., concurring) (writ-
ing separately to address disturbing aspect of lower court's order denying father's request for
court approval to enroll children in Montessori school; mother's status as primary custodian
did not trump joint custodial father's equal right to make decisions concerning children's
education; sole question was what was in best interests of child); Pearson v. Pearson, 871
P.2d 343, 350 (Nev. 1994) (Shearing, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority that pro-
ceedings before Second Judicial District Court Judge Whitehead conformed to Nevada law,
where mother received no notice that psychologist had been appointed, had examined hus-
band while she was in Las Vegas on medical school surgical rotation, and had submitted
report to court which provided basis for court's award of primary physical custody to father;
judge's order violated concepts of fundamental fairness and due process).
273 See Gepford v. Gepford, 13 P.3d 47, 51 (Nev. 2000) (Shearing, J., dissenting) (disagree-
ing with majority's reversal of trial court's change of custody from father to mother; trial
court's determination that mother would be "the better parent to allow frequent and continu-
ing association with the other parent .... one of the most important factors in determining
who should have child custody").
274 Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 930 P.2d 111 0 (Nev. 1997).
275 Id. at 1121 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 1122 (citing Culbertson v. Culbertson, 533 P.2d 768, 770 (Nev. 1975)).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
[Vol. 6:156
JUSTICE MIRIAM SHEARING
Preschool investigation and trial in Manhattan Beach, California. 280  The
McMartin case shone a spotlight on the questionable reliability of children's
allegations and trial testimony in such cases.2 8' Over the next decade,
Nevada's courts struggled to accommodate the conflicting interests of the child
and the accused.
In 2002, the Nevada Supreme Court resolved one of the critical issues in
Braunstein v. State. 282 The court concluded that the trial court's failure to con-
duct a pretrial "trustworthiness" hearing did not "warrant automatic reversal,"
but was subject to harmless error analysis.28 3 In so ruling, the court overturned
a line of cases beginning with Lytle v. State,284 a decision rendered prior to
Shearing's election to the court. In Lytle, the court ruled that the trial court's
failure to conduct a "trustworthiness" hearing before allowing the introduction
of hearsay statements of the five year-old victim was reversible error and
required reversal of the defendant's conviction for open and gross lewdness
with a child under fourteen years of age.2 85 Once on the bench, Shearing was
unable to gain a majority, but her dissenting opinion in Quevedo v. State,2 86 in
which Chief Justice Steffen joined,2 87 presaged Braunstein.
Similarly, Shearing's influence was not immediately apparent in the
court's rulings on the question whether child victims should be required to
submit to psychological examination pretrial. Her dissenting opinion in
Marvelle v. State,28 8 joined by Justice Maupin,28 9 chided the majority for let-
ting its personal views guide its decision to reverse the defendant's conviction
for open and gross lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. 290 The
dissent's concluding paragraph illustrates Shearing's understanding of the trau-
matic effects of sexual abuse:
The majority questions the victim's credibility, citing the fact that the victim has had
problems in her relationships and her behavior. Unfortunately, victims of sexual
abuse usually have problems in these areas by the very reason of the fact that they
280 See People v. Buckley, No. A750900 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. 1990).
281 See Maggie Bruck et al., Reliability and Credibility of Young Children's Reports: From
Research to Policy and Practice, in CHILDREN AND THE LAW: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS 86,
92 (Ray Bull ed., 2001) (reporting that none of the hundreds of allegations of sexual abuse
were ever substantiated, and all defendants were acquitted after a three-year long trial).
282 40 P.3d 413 (Nev. 2002).
283 Id. at 420.
284 816 P.2d 1082 (Nev. 1991).
285 Id. at 1083.
286 930 P.2d 750, 753 (Nev. 1997) (Shearing, J., dissenting) (advocating harmless error
analysis as appropriate standard, where child had testified and been subject to cross-exami-
nation, and her testimony was "merely repetitive"). Interestingly, it is Chief Justice Steffen's
separate dissent that voiced outright concern for the child victim, calling "the wooden deci-
sion to subject this child-victim to the trauma of another trial ... most distressing." Id. at
751 (Steffen, C.J., dissenting). Shearing's dissent, though reaching the same conclusion as
Steffen, is consistent with her minimalist approach to judicial decision making. See supra
notes 94 through 108 and accompanying text.
287 Id. at 753.
288 966 P.2d 151, 157 (Nev. 1998) (Shearing, J., dissenting).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 159 (challenging the majority's dismissal of expert's testimony as "psychological
jargon" and stating, "[t]his court is in no position to allow its personal opinion of the theory
to affect its ruling.").
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have been sexually abused. That is why it is particularly important that the jurors see
the witnesses and listen to all of the evidence, both good and bad, so that they may
judge the truth.291
Two years later, Koerschner v. State292 abrogated Marvelle and other
prior decisions293 and established a "compelling need" standard for defense
requests for court-ordered psychological evaluations of sexual assault vic-
tims. 294 Shearing's influence on the court's decision is evident in the major-
ity's explicit agreement 295 with her separate concurrence.2 9 6 Shearing took
issue with her colleague Rose's argument 297 that sexual assault defendants are
entitled to psychological examinations to "'level the playing field"' in child
sexual assault cases. 298 Although Shearing agreed with Rose that "there is no
'level playing field' in child sexual assault cases,"299 her experience as a trial
and juvenile court judge taught her that "the so-called 'playing field' is virtu-
ally always tipped heavily against the child victim."" Too often, defendants
sought a psychological examination "to further demean and harass the child
victim. ' '301 The court was, therefore, correct in ruling that such examinations
should be allowed "only in the rare cases when there is a compelling reason to
do so.
' 3
0 2
The sexual abuse cases demonstrate that Shearing's concern for the rights
of children and her appreciation for their vulnerabilities run deep.30 3 Two final
cases further reveal the breadth of her commitment to children's rights.
Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial District Court3" is a decision that Shearing
is "proud" to have authored.30 5 Her majority opinion withdrew the court's ear-
lier ruling that the statute at issue was unconstitutional 0 6 and upheld the dis-
291 Id. at 160.
292 13 P.3d 451 (Nev. 2000).
293 See id. at 455.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 457 n.6.
296 Id. at 459 (Shearing, J., concurring).
297 Id. at 457 (Rose, J., concurring).
298 Id. at 459.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. See also State v. Romano, 97 P.3d 594 (Nev. 2004) (joining majority in granting
writ of prohibition challenging trial court's order compelling psychological evaluation of
child sexual assault victim).
303 Cf Winnerford v. State, 915 P.2d 291, 295-98 (Nev. 1996) (Shearing, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority's reversal of sexual assault delinquency adjudication of ten year
old boy who had been playing game with other children called "hide-and-go-get-it" and was
charged with placing his hand between girl's legs and jabbing at her crotch; whether he
knew act was wrong was irrelevant; juvenile court system provides helpful guidance in
teaching children appropriate conduct, as here, where boy was put on three years formal
probation and ordered to complete sexual offense psychoeducational program and participate
in family counseling with mother; stating: "The majority appears to regard the alleged
actions as mere child's play. I strongly disagree. The children were playing a nasty game
which foreshadows adult criminal activity if the children are not properly educated.").
4 64 P.3d 1056 (Nev. 2003) (Kirkpatrick II).
305 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
306 Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 43 P.3d 998 (2002) (Kirkpatrick I).
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trict court's controversial 30 7 approval of the marriage of a fifteen year old girl
to a forty-eight year old man.3°8 The foundation for the Shearing court's hold-
ing was its recognition of the girl's right to marry309 under a Nevada law per-
mitting a minor under sixteen to marry with the consent of one parent and the
approval of the court.310 United States Supreme Court decisions recognizing
the fundamental right to marry31' and the applicability of constitutional rights
to children as well as adults 3 12 supplied the constitutional underpinnings for the
Shearing court's ruling. In the end, the majority upheld the constitutionality of
the Nevada statute pursuant to which the district court had approved the mar-
riage because it "strikes a balance between an arbitrary rule of age for marriage
and accommodation of individual differences and circumstances. 313
The same disdain for arbitrariness, and its resulting unfairness, lies at the
heart of Shearing's dissent in Greco v. United States.31 4 In questions of first
impression, the majority ruled that a mother had a medical malpractice claim
for failure to diagnose "gross and disabling fetal defects," but that the child
born with those defects had no cognizable claim.31 5 The majority rejected the
child's claim based on its conclusion that doing so "would require us to weigh
the harms suffered by virtue of the child's having been born with severe handi-
caps against 'the utter void of nonexistence' . . . a calculation the courts are
incapable of performing. '316 Shearing disagreed; the court 317 and the legisla-
307 See, e.g., Editorial: Gaston's Judgment, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 28, 2001, at 10A;
Glen Puitt, Couple Fights for Marriage, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 8, 2001, at IB; Glenn
Puitt, Man Trying to Remarry Teen in New Mexico, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 5, 2001, at 6B;
Glenn Puitt, State Supreme Court to Review Marriage of 15-Year-Old to 48-Year-Old, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 26, 2001, at 1B; Ed Vogel, Supreme Court: Judge Faulted for
Allowing Teen to Marry, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 16, 2001, at lB.
308 64 P.2d at 1057. The decision arose out of the minor's petition for rehearing after the
supreme court declared unconstitutional the statute pursuant to which the district court had
approved her marriage, and thereby voided the marriage. See Kirkpatrick 1, 43 P.3d 998.
The Kirkpatrick H court granted the petition, withdrew its earlier decision, and issued the
opinion discussed here. See 64 P.2d at 1057. In essence, Justice Shearing's dissent in Kirk-
patrick I became, with the addition of Justice Rose, the majority in Kirkpatrick 1. Compare
Kirkpatrick Il, 64 P.3d at 1064, with Kirkpatrick 1, 43 P.2d at 1015 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
309 See Kirkpatrick H, 64 P.3d. at 1060.
310 Id. at 1057 (NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.025 (2004)).
311 Id. at 1059-60 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (striking down as
unconstitutional impingement on fundamental right to marry state statute requiring anyone
with out-of-state child support obligations to obtain court approval before marrying)).
312 Id. at 1060 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (recognizing due process rights of
juveniles facing delinquency charges; "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone")); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) (holding blanket parental consent for abortion by minor unconstitutional; "Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.").
313 Id. at 1061.
314 893 P.2d 345, 352 (Nev. 1995) (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The court exercised jurisdiction under Rule 5 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure,
pursuant to which the United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified the
dispositive state law questions in Greco to the Nevada Supreme Court. Id. at 347.
315 Id. at 346-47. The child was born with spina bifida, hydrocephaly, and related deformi-
ties that left him mentally retarded and paraplegic from the hips down. Id. at 347 n.2.
316 Id. at 347.
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ture3 18 had already established a policy that "in some situations, non-life may
be preferable to an impaired life."' 3 19 Moreover, that policy recognized that
"each individual has the right to make his or her determination as to the relative
value of life and non-life."32 Thus, in the context of an action for professional
negligence, Shearing "would allow the child the cost of the extraordinary
expenses attributable to the impairment. '321 For Shearing, that was the only
fair result: "The claims of the child and the parents are mutually dependent; it
would be unfair to deny compensation to the child if the parent or parents are
not available to make their claim.' 3
2 2
Shearing's concern for fairness to the child in Greco exemplifies her
approach to questions of children's rights across the legal spectrum. However,
that overarching concern, coupled with Shearing's high regard for the rights of
children, caused her on occasion to move from strict minimalism to a more
liberal minimalism akin to that of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.323
A case in point is Kirkpatrick II. Had Shearing adhered to the basic mini-
malist principle of "do[ing] no more than is necessary to resolve cases, ' 324 she
would have limited her ruling in Kirkpatrick II to the issues raised in the
rehearing petition and not revisited the constitutionality of the statute pursuant
to which the district court had approved the fifteen year old petitioner's mar-
riage to a 48-year old man.325 The Kirkpatrick II dissenters, who had declared
the statute unconstitutional in Kirkpatrick 1,326 took the Shearing majority to
task for treating the case "as though it were before the court for the first
time' 3 27 and argued that "the only issue raised on rehearing is whether the
district court should be required to conduct a new hearing." '328 But that was
decidedly not the only issue on the minds of Shearing and those who joined in
her majority opinion; much more was at stake than whether the district court
should conduct a new hearing.3 29 This was no mere procedural question, but a
317 Id. at 354 (citing McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (affirming
quadriplegic's right to withdraw respirator)).
318 Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.535-690 (2005) (providing for deprivation of life-
sustaining procedures)).
319 Id.
320 id.
321 id.
322 id.
323 See Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, supra note 92, at 18, where Sunstein
discusses the wide array of minimalist views. "We can easily find liberal minimalists and
conservative minimalists." Id. Sunstein says of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's approach to
the law that it "is complex, but it is fair to describe her as a liberal minimalist," while
conservative minimalism "is nicely captured in the opinions of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor." Id.
324 Id. at 18.
325 Kirkpatrick 1, 43 P.3d 998, 1012 (Nev. 2002) (holding statute unconstitutional on proce-
dural due process grounds).
326 Id.
327 Kirkpatrick H, 64 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Nev. 2003) (Agosti, C.J., dissenting).
328 id.
329 For Justice Shearing, the majority's holding in Kirkpatrick I that parents have a constitu-
tional right to notification of important events in a child's life was troubling. The United
States Supreme Court has never recognized such a right, and Shearing feared that Kirkpat-
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fundamental question of the right of any fifteen year old who, like the peti-
tioner, was not yet quite old enough to marry without parental consent and
court authorization, yet was sufficiently mature to enter into marriage, to do so.
Here, in this exceptional case, Shearing displayed her more liberal mini-
malist bent by announcing a sweeping ruling that was not essential to resolution
of the precise issue before the court. In other respects, however, Shearing
stayed the course of strict minimalism. Her decision spoke only of fifteen year
olds, and not anyone of a younger age.33 ° It is no stretch of the imagination to
anticipate that the court will soon consider a case brought by a twelve, thirteen
or fourteen year old who seizes the opportunity presented by the court's state-
ment, in dicta, that "[a]ge alone is an arbitrary factor." '33 1 But in Shearing's
decidedly minimalist style, Kirkpatrick II left those decisions for another day.
D. Women and the Law
Justice Shearing did not set out to further the cause of women's rights
through judicial activism. Instead, when she joined Nevada's high court, she
followed her usual course of deciding each case as she saw it. If, however, the
aggrieved party happened to be a woman, Shearing was well positioned to con-
tribute a viewpoint the high court lacked before her election to it in 1992.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court,332 the Nevada Supreme Court does
not often have occasion to rule on matters that directly impact women's
rights.3 33 Nonetheless, in those cases that presented an opportunity for the
unique contributions of a female jurist, Shearing was up to the challenge.
Shearing authored a series of decisions involving petitions by mothers3 34
to relocate out of state with children for whom they were the primary physical
custodian, but whose legal custody was joint with the fathers. The Nevada
legislature had enacted procedures for obtaining court approval to relocate in
such situations,3 35 and the supreme court already had issued several opinions
interpreting the statute.336 Despite the guidance available from those sources,
some lower court judges persisted in misapplying the law, to the disadvantage,
largely, of women. The following statement by the Trent v. Trent3 37 court
reveals its frustration:
rick I would lead to a holding that a child must notify both parents of any significant deci-
sion, particularly abortion, in direct contravention of all the Supreme Court decisions.
Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
330 Kirkpatrick H, 64 P.3d at 1060.
331 Id.
332 See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1549-53
(1991) (commenting on how Supreme Court jurisprudence has changed in response to
women's changing position in society).
333 Interview with Miriam Shearing, supra note 2.
334 Shearing did not single out mothers for preferential treatment over fathers; the fact is
that, most often, the losing parties in trial court rulings on relocation petitions were women,
not men. Shearing Interview supra note 2. A few years before the series of decisions
described here, a Shearing majority ruled in favor of a father whose relocation petition the
trial court had denied. See Gandee v. Gandee, 895 P.2d 1285 (Nev. 1995).
115 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.350 (now § 125C.200) (2004).
336 See, e.g., Gandee, 895 P.2d at 1285; Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309 (Nev. 1995);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268 (Nev. 1991).
337 890 P.2d 1309.
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We find it disturbing that despite our decision in Schwartz [v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d
1268 (Nev. 1991)], many district courts are using NRS 125A.350 as a means to chain
custodial parents, most often women, to the state of Nevada. NRS 125A.350 is pri-
marily a notice statute intended to prevent one parent from in effect "stealing" the
children away from the other parent by moving them away to another state and
attempting to sever contact. . .. [I]t should not be used to prevent the custodial
parent from freely pursuing a life outside of Nevada when reasonable alternative
visitation is possible.3 3 8  -
But prevent custodial mothers from pursuing advantageous opportunities
out of state is just what the lower courts continued to do, even after Trent. Two
Shearing opinions reversing district court denials of custodial mothers' reloca-
tion petitions illustrate the lower courts' disregard for the legitimacy of
women's interests and the Nevada Supreme Court's resolve to firmly apply the
law.
In McGuinness v. McGuinness,3 39 the former wife sought to relocate to
Virginia, where she could be near siblings and other family members, live in
her recently deceased mother's home, complete college, and become a teacher,
rather than remaining in Las Vegas at a dead-end secretarial job.3 40 The trial
court denied her petition based on its conclusion that her relocation would
render impossible the parties' joint physical custody arrangement for their
child. 341 The Shearing majority reversed, quoting Trent and admonishing the
lower court to apply the proper legal standards, which required the court to
consider "the possibility of reasonable, alternative visitation '  once the peti-
tioner presented a good faith reason for the move.343 The court further stressed
that "the well-being of a parent, which could be heightened by relocation, may
have a substantial effect on the best interest of the child." 3" Moreover, "unless
the parents' interests are considered as part of the calculus of these decisions, a
parent properly seeking a motion to move would be irrevocably chained to this
state by our child custody laws."34 5
In Hayes v. Gallacher,34 6 the former wife sought approval to relocate with
her three minor children to Japan, where her second husband had been trans-
ferred by the United States Air Force.3 47 Without conducting an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the motion to relocate and, at the same time,
granted the former husband's countermotion to change primary physical cus-
338 Id. at 1313.
339 970 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1998).
340 Id. at 1075.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 1078-79.
343 Id. at 1079. See also Halbrook v. Halbrook, 971 P.2d 1262 (Nev. 1998) (reversing
denial of relocation petition where former wife's enhanced career opportunities in Texas
were sensible, good faith reason for move and her alternative visitation plan was reasonable);
Blaich v. Blaich, 971 P.2d 822 (Nev. 1998) (reversing denial of former wife's petition to
relocate to Texas and award of custody to former husband and admonishing lower court to
follow applicable law).
4 McGuinness, 970 P.2d at 1078.
345 Id. at 1079.
346 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999).
347 Id. at 1139.
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tody if his former wife moved to Japan. 348 The Shearing majority reversed,
noting in particular that the lower court had failed to consider the statutory
presumption against assigning sole or primary custody of minors to perpetrators
of domestic violence,34 9 even though evidence in the record showed that the
former husband had committed such violence and that the lower court had
extended the former wife's protective order for a year.350 Even without the
domestic violence problem, the trial court erred badly: "In this case, the public
policy considerations make the district court's conditional order particularly
unacceptable in that it is designed to test the maternal attachment by forcing
[the former wife] to choose between her children and her husband."35 ' With
those words, Shearing made clear her views of both the law and the realities of
contemporary life for families.
Likewise, Shearing refused to participate in the perpetuation of myths
about women who are victims of sexual assault. The cases discussed here illus-
trate Shearing's impact on the court's treatment of defendants' claims of victim
consent and lack of credibility.
In Honeycutt v. State,352 the defendant asserted that he believed the victim
had consented to his sexual acts.353 The Shearing majority acknowledged that
the law entitled him to a jury instruction on "reasonable mistaken belief, 354
but upheld the trial court's refusal to give his proposed instruction.3 55 The
instruction was not merely "technically deficient in form, 35 6 as the dissent
argued, 357 but "an incorrect statement of the law."'358 The defense had pro-
posed an instruction that recited, in part, an approved California jury instruc-
tion, 359 but left out the following: "However, a belief that is based upon
ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person
or another is not a reasonable good faith belief."'360 The Shearing majority
found in the record substantial evidence that the defendant obtained the vic-
tim's "consent" through "threats, force, and violence"; therefore, the proposed
instruction was incorrect as a matter of law.3
6 1
Shearing's majority opinion in Johnson v. State3 62 displays a similar atten-
tion to the concerns of sexual assault victims. The trial court had refused to
allow the defense to impeach the victim's testimony that she was a virgin
before the incident here with her preliminary hearing testimony that she had
348 Id.
349 Id. at 1141 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (2004)).
350 Id.
351 Id. at 1142.
352 56 P.3d 362 (Nev. 2002).
353 Id. at 368.
354 Id. at 369.
355 Id. at 370.
356 Id. at 369.
357 Id. at 374 (Rose, J., dissenting).
358 Id. at 369.
359 Id. at 369 (citing CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 10.65, at 828 (6th ed.
1996)).
360 Id.
361 Id. at 369-70.
362 942 P.2d 167 (Nev. 1997).
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been sexually molested when she was nine or ten.3 63 Despite a strong dis-
sent, 3 6 Shearing mustered a majority to join her opinion affirming the convic-
tion and thereby protecting the victim from an attack on her credibility when no
evidence supported the defense claim of prior sexual penetration.
3 6 5
But Shearing was not always so successful. In Cipriano v. State,366 she
was unable to persuade the majority that the testimony of the defendant's
daughter-in-law revealed behavior similar to what he was alleged to have done
to the victim.3 67 In both cases, the victims alleged that: "[The defendant] used
force and intimidation to gain sexual favors .... [He] placed them in a position
where they could not retreat ... kissed or attempted to kiss them, touched them
on the breasts and touched them in the crotch area despite their attempts to fight
him off."3 6 8 Those allegations, Shearing said, indicated that the defendant's
acts "were part of a common scheme or plan and showed his deliberate intent to
commit open and gross lewdness. 3 6 9 Although not admissible in the state's
case in chief, the testimony was admissible to rebut the defendant's testimony
that "the victim in this case attempted to seduce him, that he had never
threatened violence to women, and that he had always been a gentleman around
women." 370 Thus, Sheaing would have affirmed the defendant's conviction of
open and gross lewdness.371
Like women in sexual assault cases, women entering the mental health
system often get little respect from male-dominated courts. The dangers of
involuntary commitment to a psychiatric facility provoked a strong dissent
from Shearing in Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hospital of Las Vegas.3 72 The plaintiff
voluntarily committed herself to the defendant treatment facility after abusing
alcohol and methamphetamine.37 3 Hospital doctors concluded that she was
suffering from major depression and suicidal ideation. 374 The next day,
Schlotfeldt said she was ready to go home, but the doctors refused to release
her because they thought she was a suicide risk and her husband was out of
town.375 Eventually, she gained release, but not until she had spent sixty-six
hours at the facility.3 76 Schlotfeldt's later suit for false imprisonment resulted
in a jury verdict in her favor.3 77
The supreme court overturned the jury verdict, based on what Shearing
said in her dissent were irrelevant issues. The crux of the case, in Shearing's
363 Id. at 170-7 1.
31 Id. at 171 (Rose, J., dissenting).
365 Id. at 170-71.
366 894 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
964 P.2d 48 (Nev. 1998).
367 Id. at 353 (Shearing, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 354.
371 Id.
372 910 P.2d 271 (Nev. 1996).
373 Id. at 272.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 273.
378 Id. at 276 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6:156
JUSTICE MIRIAM SHEARING
view, was the hospital's abuse of its limited power to hold Schlotfeldt
involuntarily.3 79
Involuntary commitment is one of the most dangerous weapons that a society can
employ. Totalitarian governments have used it extensively against their political ene-
mies. Private organizations can use it for financial gain. Because of the inherent
potential for misuse of this weapon, it is crucial that the procedural safeguards estab-
lished by the State be strictly observed.380
Here, the hospital made no attempt to follow Nevada law by obtaining a
court order or a certification from a physician as required to detain Schlotfeldt
after she insisted on leaving.381' Therefore, Shearing said, "[t]he hospital had
no legal justification for detaining her," and the verdict in her favor should
stand.3 8
2
Similarly, Shearing would have upheld the jury verdict in favor of a Uni-
versity of Nevada, Reno sociology professor on her Equal Pay Act claim,
which the majority reversed in University and Community College System of
Nevada v. Farmer.3 83 Based on the jury's verdict in Farmer's favor and in
contrast to her male colleagues, Shearing concluded that "the jury did not
believe the University's witnesses. ' '3 84 Shearing explained: "Regardless of our
own inclinations, we must accept the fact that the jury believed that the dispar-
ity in pay between Farmer and her male colleague was based on gender dis-
crimination." '3 85 Unfortunately for Farmer and perhaps for other women in the
future, Shearing's view did not carry the day.
In contrast, the unanimous decision Shearing authored in Shelton v.
Shelton3 86 was an unadulterated victory for a former military wife and those
similarly situated. Shelton considered the applicability of federal law to the
interpretation of provisions in a divorce decree.387 The underlying facts were
these: Roland and Maryann had been married for more than sixteen years
when they jointly petitioned for dissolution of their marriage. 388 The terms of
their property settlement agreement designated both Roland's military retire-
ment pay and his military disability pay as community property. 389 The agree-
ment further allocated to Roland one-half of his retirement pay, in the amount
of $500, and all of his disability pay, in the amount of $174; and to Maryann,
the "other half' of Roland's retirement pay, in the amount of $577, for the
duration of her life. 390 After the divorce decree, Roland's disability status was
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 See id. (hospital could have obtained court order pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 433A.200-330 (2003) or physician's certification pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 433A.160-180 (2003)).
382 Id.
383 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998).
384 d.at 739 (Shearing, J., dissenting).
385 Id.
386 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960 (2004).
387 Id. at 508.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 Id. At the time of the divorce, Roland was receiving $1000 per month in retirement pay
and, based on a ten percent disability, $174 in disability pay. Id.
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upgraded from ten to one hundred percent disabled, and he elected to waive his
military retirement benefits for an equal amount in tax-exempt disability pay, as
allowed by federal law.39 ' Then, two years after the divorce decree, Roland
stopped making the monthly payments of $577 to Maryann.39 2
Based on its reading of federal law, the family court judge rejected Mary-
ann's efforts to enforce the divorce decree, "despite repeatedly saying how
unfair the result was to Maryann. '393 On appeal, the Shearing court recog-
nized, as had the district court, that federal law prohibits states from treating
veterans' disability benefits as community property.394 That did not conclude
the analysis, however, because the dispositive issue was a question of Nevada
law: What was the parties' intent, as expressed in their property settlement
agreement? 395 Applying standard principles of contract interpretation, 39 6 the
Shearing court concluded that the parties' agreement was for Roland to pay
Maryann $577 each month, rather than one-half of his retirement pay, which
would have been only $500.397 Moreover, "Roland ratified the terms of the
agreement by performing his obligations under the decree for a period of two
years. ' 398 Shearing summed up in fairness terms: "Roland cannot escape his
contractual obligation by voluntarily choosing to forfeit his retirement pay." 3 99
With the exception of Shearing's relocation opinions, the cases treated
here make no mention of women's rights or well-being. Yet, Shearing's care-
ful analysis will benefit scores of women because she offered a new perspective
for her colleagues to consider, and whether intentional or not, her decisions
enhanced the rights of women. As we have seen before, Shearing limited her
review and commentary to the issues squarely presented and the evidence in the
record below and did not engage in sweeping condemnations of practices that
may well have offended her personally. For example, her dissent in Scholtfeldt
mentions nothing about the historic mistreatment of women through commit-
ment to mental institutions as a means of social control or the over-diagnosis of
mental illness in women whose responses to injustices in their lives were
rational and sane.4" Nor does she trumpet the military retirement pay ruling as
a long overdue stroke of financial justice for women.4 ' As with her other
decisions in which women were subjected to stereotypical and degrading treat-
391 Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5305 (2000)).
392 Id.
393 Id.
'9' Id. at 509 (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 589 (1989) (interpreting Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (2000), as grant of
authority to state courts to treat "disposable retired pay," but not "total retired pay," includ-
ing disability pay, as community property)).
195 Id. at 510.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 See PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 164 (1989) (critiquing patriarchal social
construction of women's mental illnesses).
401 See Brad M. LaMorgese & Robert E. Holmes, Jr., Division of Retirement Benefits: The
Impact of Federal Preemption on Women in Texas, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 226 (1998)
(commenting on inequity women in community property states suffer from denial of spousal
military retirement benefits, calling for others to seek ways to remedy injustice, and criticiz-
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ment by our various systems, Shearing's minimalist principles and considerable
experience guided her, and that makes each small victory for women all the
sweeter.
E. The Death Penalty
Justice Shearing will not likely be remembered as a proponent of a kinder,
gentler death penalty. Neither should she be seen as a "hangin' judge." Her
death penalty jurisprudence, while not affording the sort of reading any defense
lawyer would savor,4 ° 2 nevertheless consistently and coherently sought to
assure that those given the ultimate sanction for their crimes received a fair and
dispassionate hearing. Throughout her years on the Nevada Supreme Court,
Shearing ruled on many direct appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief
brought by occupants of Nevada's death row. It is fair to say that she (and a
majority of the court) rarely saw reason to reverse a conviction.40 3 However,
ing Texas courts for according federal law preemptive power over any contrary action under
state law).
402 See, e.g., Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 449 (Nev. 2002) (Shearing, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's analysis and conclusions and stating she would affirm trial court's
denial of habeas petition and uphold death penalty and would not overrule "extensive and
well-established legal precedent" concerning application of "random and without apparent
motive" aggravator as applied to killing during robbery, where statutory procedural bar also
precluded court's consideration of claim). The precedent overruled by the Leslie majority,
Bennett v. State, 787 P.2d 797 (Nev. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 925 (1990), had affirmed
a death sentence imposed by Shearing when she was an Eighth Judicial District Court judge.
See id. Moreover, Shearing had written for the majority in rejecting Leslie's direct appeal.
See Leslie v. State, 952 P.2d 966 (Nev. 1998). See also Lane v. State, 881 P.2d 1358 (Nev.
1994) (Shearing, for majority, affirming jury finding of "random and without apparent
motive" aggravator in robbery conviction), overruled by Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 430, 446
(2002); Atkins v. State, 923 P.2d 1119 (Nev. 1996) (affirming murder conviction and death
sentence, even after reversing sexual assault conviction because state failed to prove victim
was alive at time of alleged sexual assault, as required by Nevada law).
403 But see Young v. State, 102 P.3d 572 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam) (reversing conviction
and death sentence where district court denied defendant's motion for substitution of counsel
and conducted inadequate inquiry into irreconcilable differences between defendant and
defense counsel); Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 890 (Nev. 2003) (per curiam) (reversing convic-
tion and death sentence where trial court met privately with reluctant State witness without
making record of meeting, failed to notify counsel before communicating with jury on sub-
stantive matter, unduly limited defendant's cross-examination of surviving victims, excluded
testimony by defense witnesses regarding prior violent conduct by victims known to defen-
dant, and refused to question juror about juror's comment to bailiff, asking why defendant
was not in shackles; and where, as matters of apparent first impression, prosecutors asked
defendant whether other witnesses had lied, or goaded defendant into accusing other wit-
nesses of lying, where defendant did not directly challenge veracity of other witnesses during
his direct examination); Mazzan v. Warden, 993 P.2d 25 (Nev. 2000) (per curiam) (granting
capital defendant's habeas petition based on prosecutors' Brady violation in failing to dis-
close police reports); Manley v. State, 979 P.2d 703 (Nev. 1999) (per curiam) (reversing
conviction and death sentence based on trial court's violation of defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel); Jimenez v. State, 918 P.2d 687 (Nev. 1996) (per curiam) (granting
capital defendant's habeas petition based on prosecutor's Brady violation in failing to dis-
close evidence concerning other possible suspects and informant's associations with police
in other cases); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052 (Nev. 1994) (per curiam) (reversing conviction
and death sentence where defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by conceding cli-
ent's guilt during guilt phase of capital trial, despite not guilty plea).
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as often as not, she concluded in decisions she authored that the defendant
suffered a deprivation of bedrock rights in the sentencing phase of the capital
proceedings. 4" 4 And even when she concluded that neither the facts nor the
application of the law in a particular case required reversal of the conviction or
death sentence, she took pains to point out prosecutorial misconduct and other
deficiencies that, though harmless in their effect on the result, called for com-
ment and prophylactic measures.4 0 5
The foundation for Shearing's death penalty resentencing decisions is the
Eighth Amendment's requirement that the death penalty "be imposed fairly,
and with reasonable consistency, or not at all."40 6 Her conclusion that the
defendant had not received a fair penalty hearing compelled the reversal of the
death sentences imposed by the jury in several decisions she authored.4 0 7 The
significance of those rulings warrants treatment of each here.
In the earliest case, Chambers v. State,4" 8 Shearing's majority decision
both vacated the death sentence and directed the imposition of a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole.4"9 The court's statutorily prescribed indepen-
dent review of the record4 10 compelled the court to conclude that the death
404 See text accompanying notes 408-63.
405 See, e.g., Gallego v. State, 23 P.3d 227 (Nev. 2001) (clarifying trial court's ruling on
self-representation requests and admonishing prosecutor who had improperly suggested that
defense had burden to disprove aggravators); Vanisi v. State, 22 P.3d 1164 (Nev. 2001)
(clarifying law governing motions for self-representation; complexity of legal issues is not
basis for denial of defendant's right to represent himself), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1024
(2001); Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700, 714 (Nev. 2000) (abandoning previous line of author-
ity and requiring separate instruction on meanings of "premeditation" and "deliberation" in
first degree murder cases); Leonard v. State, 958 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1998) (finding that
defense counsel, though not rendering ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland
test, misstated law regarding directed verdict, performed deficiently in not presenting evi-
dence of victim's prior possession of weapon, erred in asking defense witness whether he
was carrying a weapon, and should have presented expert testimony on defendant's mental
and emotional problems at penalty hearing), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999); Greene v.
State, 931 P.2d 54, 62 (Nev. 1997) (warning prosecutor that supreme court will not tolerate
such behavior as his during opening argument, when he repeatedly ignored district judge's
admonitions). But see Parker v. State, 849 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (Nev. 1993) (affirming death
sentence after finding neither prosecutorial misconduct nor error in trial judge's refusal to
declare mistrial after striking victim's brother's testimony that defendant had "fatal attrac-
tion" to victim and admonishing jury to disregard it).
406 See, e.g., Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 997 (Nev. 2000) (quoting Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
407 See Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 83-86 (Nev. 2004); Servin v. State, 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev.
2001); Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2000); Chambers v. State, 944 P.2d 805 (Nev.
1997).
408 944 P.2d 805 (Nev. 1997).
409 Id. at 812. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.055 (2003), which provides, in pertinent part:
3. The Supreme Court, when reviewing a death sentence, may: (a) Affirm the sentence of death;
(b) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for a new penalty hearing before a newly impan-
eled jury; or (c) Set aside the sentence of death and impose the sentence of imprisonment for life
without possibility of parole.
410 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2) (2003), which provides:
Whether or not the defendant or his counsel affirmatively waives the appeal, the sentence must
be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court, which shall consider, in a single proceeding, if
an appeal is taken: a) Any errors enumerated by way of appeal; (b) If a court determined that the
defendant is not mentally retarded during a hearing held pursuant to NRS 174.098, whether that
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penalty was excessive and to impose the lesser sentence, rather than remanding
the case to the trial court for a new penalty hearing. 4 ' Upon review of the
evidence, the court found insufficient support for the two aggravating circum-
stances 4 12 on which the jury based its death sentence: that the murder involved
torture and that Chambers had prior convictions.4 1 3 Contrary to the jury's find-
ing that Chambers tortured his victim, the evidence did not demonstrate any
intent to torture and instead was "far more consistent with there having been a
fight" between the two men.4 4 As to the "prior convictions" aggravator, the
court determined that crimes which occurred eighteen years before the verdict
in question when Chambers was just eighteen years old "hardly show[ ] a pat-
tem of violence sufficient to justify the death penalty."4 5 Thus, based on the
unique circumstances of the case, the court deemed a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole "more appropriate than a death sentence. 41 6
Three years later, in Hollaway v. State,41 7 the court concluded that a num-
ber of troubling aspects of the trial had improperly influenced the imposition of
the death penalty and, accordingly, remanded for a new penalty hearing.4 8
One of the grounds for setting the death sentence aside implicated the prosecu-
tor in the "apparently accidental" activation of Hollaway's stun belt at a partic-
ularly timely stage of the state's closing argument and thus served unfairly to
reinforce for the jury the prosecution's image of Hollaway as an extremely
violent man. 4 19 The prosecutor's conduct provided the second ground for
vacation of the sentence as well; he improperly appealed to jurors' passions and
emotions by arguing that the victim's family would "have no more holidays
determination was correct; (c) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance or circumstances; (d) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence
of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and (e) Whether the sentence of death is excessive,
considering both the crime and the defendant.
411 944 P.2d at 812. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.055(3)(c) (2003), the full text of which is
set out in note 409 above.
412 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (2003) (listing exclusive circumstances by which first
degree murder may be aggravated).
413 944 P.2d at 811.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 812.
417 6 P.3d 987 (Nev. 2000).
418 Id. at 994 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(3) (2004) (providing for remand as one
option for the reviewing court).
419 Id. See also Wegner v. State, 14 P.3d 25 (Nev. 2000) (Shearing, writing for majority,
reversing first degree murder conviction and admonishing prosecutor for arguing facts not in
record and vouching for strength of evidence against defendant during closing argument);
Silva v. State, 951 P.2d 591, 596-97 (Nev. 1997) (Shearing, J., concurring) (finding revers-
ible error based on prosecutorial misconduct in putting witness/co-defendant on stand while
knowing full well that he would refuse to testify; commenting on refusal to testify by saying,
in presence of jury, "because you don't want to be a snitch up at jail, right?"; focusing in
closing argument on failure to testify; and encouraging jury to draw inference against defen-
dant based on witness/co-defendant's appearance at trial, when defendant had no opportunity
to cross-examine him).
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with their daughter," even though Nevada law precluded such "holiday
arguments. 4 20
It was the set of errors affecting the jury's consideration of the evidence
during the penalty phase, however, through which Hollaway made a lasting
imprint on Nevada's death penalty jurisprudence. 42 ' First, the Shearing court
called on trial courts to properly instruct jurors that, even if the defendant
presents no mitigating factors during the sentencing phase, they "may consider
any evidence presented in the guilt phase that may indicate that a penalty less
than death is appropriate." '4 22 The court noted in the record a number of poten-
tial mitigating factors: Hollaway had immediately reported the crime, admitted
his guilt, and expressed remorse for his actions.4 23 Moreover, extensive evi-
dence showed that intoxication had "played a major role in the crime" and that
Hollaway and the victim "had been arguing incessantly when the killing
occurred. 4 24 All of this could have provided a basis for the jury to impose a
lesser sentence than death, but the jury did not have that opportunity here
because of Hollaway's refusal to present any case in mitigation, the state's
arguments, and misleading jury instructions. 425 The court took pains to set out
a proper instruction, which it directed courts to use, to prevent such errors in
the future.426
Second, the court tackled the problem of the lower courts' and jurors'
apparent confusion over the proper use of "other matter" evidence introduced
by the state during the penalty phase.42 7 The court explained that three types of
evidence are relevant at capital penalty hearings: "evidence relating to aggra-
vating circumstances, mitigating circumstances, and 'any other matter which
the court deems relevant to sentence.'" 42 8 The court explained, further, that
"other matter" evidence is "not admissible for use by the jury in determining
420 Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 994 (Nev. 2000) (citing Quillen v. State, 929 P.2d 893,
901 (1996)); see also Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 1100 (Nev. 2002) (citing Hollaway with
approval in remanding for new capital sentencing hearing based in part on prosecutor's
improper "holiday" arguments to jury).
421 See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 83 P.3d 818 (Nev. 2004) (reiterating Hollaway admonition
for courts and juries to consider any mitigating evidence); Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450
(Nev. 2002) (reciting Hollaway explanation of statutory requirements for proper considera-
tion and weighing of aggravators and mitigators at capital sentencing hearings); Servin v.
State, 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001) (relying on Hollaway for protocol in jury determination of
aggravators and mitigators at capital sentencing hearings); Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498 (Nev.
2001) (same).
422 6 P.3d at 995.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 995.
425 Id.
416 Id. The instruction reads:
In determining whether mitigating circumstances exist, jurors have an obligation to make an
independent and objective analysis of all the relevant evidence. Arguments of counsel or a party
do not relieve jurors of this responsibility. Jurors must consider the totality of the circumstances
of the crime and the defendant, as established by the evidence presented in the guilt and penalty
phases of the trial. Neither the prosecution's nor the defendant's insistence on the existence or
nonexistence of mitigating circumstances is binding upon the jurors.
Id. at 995-96.
427 Id. at 996-97.
428 Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552(3) (2004)).
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the existence of aggravating circumstances or in weighing them against mitigat-
ing circumstances. '' 429 Finally, the court ruled that the trial judge must admon-
ish jurors that they must consider such evidence only after they have
determined, by finding at least one aggravator, that the defendant is death-eligi-
ble.43° Based on the trial court's failure to give such an instruction at Hol-
laway's sentencing hearing and the other errors described above, the court
reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty hearing.4 3'
In Servin v. State,4 32 in which the ruling was narrower than Hollaway and
more akin to Chambers, the court vacated the death sentence as excessive and
imposed a sentence of life without possibility of parole4 33 based on the jury's
faulty assessment of aggravating circumstances.43 4 The trial court had permit-
ted the jury to find both burglary and home invasion as aggravators, and the
jury had so found.4 35 That constituted error, the Shearing majority ruled,
because those aggravators were duplicative.4 36 In its ruling, the court held that
429 Id. at 997 (emphasis in original). See also Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498 (Nev. 2001)
(relying on Hollaway for statement of Nevada law concerning proper consideration of "other
matter" evidence only after jury unanimously finds at least one aggravator and determining
that it outweighs any mitigating evidence presented); Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev.
2002) (same).
430 Hollaway v. State, 6 P.3d 987, 997 (Nev. 2000); see also McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d
606 (Nev. 2004), reh'g denied, 107 P.3d 1287 (Nev. 2005) (reiterating Hollaway require-
ment that "other matter" evidence be considered only after determining whether the defen-
dant is death-eligible). If Shearing had been on the court when McConnell was decided, she
likely would have separately concurred in the result only, and not agreed with the court's
extensive reasoning in finding unconstitutional the use of the felony aggravator in capital
cases predicated on a felony murder. See id. at 620-25. Shearing's adherence to the mini-
malist "one case at a time" approach likely would have compelled her to stop short of con-
sidering the constitutionality of the felony aggravator, as it was not essential to resolution of
McConnell's appeal. He had admitted to committing a "cold-blooded, premeditated, first-
degree murder," id. at 620, and that admission justified imposition of the death sentence
against him. Id. Thus, the court's felony aggravator/felony murder analysis and decision
would not invalidate the use of the aggravator in McConnell's sentencing. Id. The court's
affirmance of McConnell's death sentence based on its premeditated nature likely would
have concluded the matter for Shearing. Cf. Schoels v. State, 966 P.2d 735, 741 (Nev. 1998)
(Shearing, J., concurring) (agreeing with dissenting justice that race of defendant and victim
should play no role in determining whether death penalty is sought, but disagreeing as to
applicability of that concern here and reiterating that court's decision "must always be based
on the evidence in the record").
431 Hollaway, 6 P.3d at 997.
432 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001).
433 Id. at 1280. Servin received two life sentences, as mandated by NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 193.165(l) (2004), the Nevada weapon enhancement statute, because he was convicted of
murder with the use of a deadly weapon. See id. at 1280 n. 1.
434 Id. at 1287, The court rejected Servin's argument that the death penalty violated the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-2, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1976), which the United States Senate had ratified in 1992, because he was
only sixteen years old at the time of the crime for which he was sentenced to death. Article
6(5) of the treaty provides that "[a S]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes com-
mitted by persons below eighteen years of age." 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. The court's rejection
of the argument accords with its earlier handling of the international law question when
raised by Michael Domingues. See Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279 (Nev. 1998), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999). See Servin, 32 P.3d at 1286.
"' Servin, 32 P.3d at 1287-88.
436 Id.
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a strict analysis under the Blockburger437 rule for determining when separate
offenses exist for double jeopardy purposes was not necessary for determining
whether multiple offenses are duplicative in the context of death penalty sen-
tencing.43 8 Although Blockburger would permit conviction of both burglary
and home invasion because "each requires proof of an element the other does
not,",43 9 allowing both as aggravating circumstances was improper, the Shear-
ing court ruled, because "the actual conduct underlying both aggravators was
identical." 440 The court thus extended a protection to capital defendants not
previously recognized in this state, and that ruling set the stage for the court to
conclude that imposition of the death penalty against Servin was excessive."
The final death penalty case considered here, Butler v. State,442 both broke
new ground and retrod old and familiar ground. The issue of first impression
presented by Butler's direct appeal arose out of the trial court's refusal to allow
both of his counsel to address the jury during the penalty phase of his trial. 43
Butler argued that he had that right, pursuant to N.R.S. § 175.151, and the
Shearing court agreed. 4
Resolution of the issue required the methodical construction of section
175.151,44 5 an exercise Shearing was well disposed to execute with precision.
The focal point of the court's analysis was the word "may," as it appeared in
two sentences of the statute. 4 6 The first sentence stated, in pertinent part: "If
the indictment or information be for an offense punishable by death, two coun-
sel on each side may argue the case to the jury."" 7 The second provided: "If it
be for any other offense, the court may, in its discretion, restrict the argument
to one counsel on each side." 44 8 Shearing reasoned that, in the first sentence,
the word "may" gave to capital counsel themselves the discretion whether two
counsel would argue, whereas its use in the second sentence vested discretion
in noncapital cases in the trial court.449 Any other reading, she concluded,
"would render the entire first sentence and its distinct wording superfluous. 450
Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to grant Butler's request. 45'
The "old and familiar" issues Butler presented look strikingly similar to
those examined above in Hollaway: "other matter" evidence 452  and
47 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
438 Servin, 32 P.3d at 1287.
419 Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).
440 Id.
441 32 P.3d at 1290. The court also considered "problematic" the quality of the evidence
that Servin had shot the victim and took into account Servin's youth, lack of significant
criminal background, expression of remorse, and drug-impaired state throughout the robbery
and murder. Id.
442 102 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2004).
443 Id. at 81.
4" Id.
445 Id.
446 Id.
47 Id. (emphasis added).
448 Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (Nev. 2004) (emphasis added).
449 Id.
450 Id.
411 Id. at 82.
452 See id. at 82-83.
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prosecutorial misconduct.45 3 Indeed, the trial court in Butler purported to base
its instruction on Hollaway,4 54 but made the fatal error of adding language that
contradicted the Hollaway admonition concerning the limited use of "other
matter" evidence and wrongly implied that such evidence could be used to
determine death eligibility.4 55 The Shearing court concluded that the trial
court's error was not harmless, particularly in light of compelling evidence of
Butler's extreme neglect and abuse during his childhood, which the jury identi-
fied as mitigating circumstances, and the sole aggravating circumstance alleged
by the state and found by the jury.4 5 6
Finally, the court reviewed the prosecutor's conduct and, as in Hollaway,
found it improper.4 57 Here, the prosecutor made inflammatory and disparaging
remarks about Butler's counsel, portraying his mitigation and other defense
tactics as "a dirty technique in an attempt to fool and distract the jury, [and]
implying that Butler's counsel acted unethically in his defense. 45 8 Shearing
soundly denounced the prosecutor's "cleverly crafted rhetoric. '4 59 At the same
time, she demonstrated her understanding of the critical role capital defense
lawyers play: "Butler not only has a legal right, but his counsel have an ethical
duty, to present all evidence in mitigation of a death sentence. The presentation
of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase is essentially the heart of a
defense."46 The court similarly dispensed with the prosecutor's disparaging
remarks that cast two defense expert witnesses as "high falootin' . . . pseudo
experts" whose testimony amounted to an "infomercial."4 6
The court observed that the erroneous "other matter" instruction may have
been sufficient, standing alone, to overturn the death penalty imposed on But-
ler.46 2 Given the other errors at the penalty hearing, the court had no difficulty
ruling that Butler had not received a fair hearing and that his case must be
remanded for a new hearing.4 6
3
In none of the cases discussed here did Shearing depart from decisional
minimalism by establishing broad rules or resolving issues of basic principle.
Instead, she conducted the searching examination of the record essential to
death penalty review, and when she found the record at odds with the law or the
facts as found by the jury, fashioned remedies narrowly confined to resolving
the problems presented, and no more.
413 See id. at 83-85.
454 Id. at 82.
455 Id. at 82-83.
456 Id. The aggravator found by the jury was that each of the two murders of which Butler
was convicted had been committed by "a person who had, in the immediate proceeding, been
convicted of more than one offense of murder." Id. at 78.
457 Id. at 85.
458 Id. at 84-85; Cf Whitney v. State, 915 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1996) (Shearing, writing for
majority, reversing conviction for receiving stolen property and admonishing prosecutor to
refrain from commenting on defense counsel's failure to call witnesses or put on evidence;
comments impermissibly shifted burden of proof to defendant).
459 Butler, 102 P.3d at 85.
460 Id. at 84-85.
461 Id. at 85 (concluding, in addition, that it was improper for prosecutor to remark on how
much expert witnesses were being paid).
462 Id. at 86.
463 Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
One may not agree with the reasoning and results in the majority decisions
Justice Shearing authored or the positions she advocated in her concurring and
dissenting opinions. One cannot say, however, that her decision-making was
unprincipled. Shearing's body of work as a Nevada Supreme Court Justice
reveals a consistent and rigorous application of jurisprudential principles of
separation of powers, strict statutory construction, deference to the fact finder,
and close scrutiny of lower court rulings on matters of law. Viewed through
the lens of decisional minimalism, Justice Shearing's opinions reflect her pref-
erence, along with that of a number of our United States Supreme Court Jus-
tices, for deciding cases on the facts presented, rather than adopting broad
theories, and for avoiding issues of basic principle. Some may find this a
wholly unsatisfactory choice for a member of the state's highest court who,
after all, has the ability to say what the law is. But it was Shearing's choice to
make and, as with so many other choices she had to make as the first woman of
the Nevada judiciary, she made it and moved on, one step at a time.
